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ABSTRACT

Among the most persistent controversies in international
investment law is the nature of the "'protectionand security"
standard found in most investment treaties. Some tribunals
contend that the standard requires nothing more than physical
protection of covered investments, while others maintain that it
requires legal security as well. Some insist that it is entirely
distinct from the fair and equitable treatment standard that is
often expressed in the same sentence or paragraph,while others
effectively conflate the two standards. These conflicting
decisions are undermining the legitimacy of investment treaty
arbitration,but this Article seeks to resolve the controversies
underlying them by employing the full range of interpretive tools
offered by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. It
explores the text, structure, and purpose of the relevant treaties;
identifies a norm of protection and security in customary
international law; and traces its evolution over time. This
inquiry reveals that treaty drafters have long understood
protection and security as requiring a specific-and limitedform of legal security. It also reveals that fair and equitable
treatment was derived from the same customary norm, but that
the two standardshave evolved to become conceptually distinct.
The Article then employs the interpretation suggested by this
analysis to critique modern treaty jurisprudenceand the current
U.S. approach to drafting investment treaties.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The rise of the modern investment treaty' has created a vibrant
new area of international law and practice, and has bestowed upon
many foreign investors a package of benefits that was previously
unimaginable. Not only do these treaties clarify and strengthen
investors' rights under international law vis-A-vis host states, but
they also offer, for the first time, an effective avenue for enforcing
those rights.2 Nevertheless, the law in this area remains unsettled in
many respects, and a persistent point of controversy is the meaning of
the phrase "protection and security" as used in most investment
treaties when detailing obligations of each party toward investments
3
emanating from the other.
The wording of protection and security provisions varies, but a
formulation found in many U.S. bilateral investment treaties (BITs)
is as follows: "Investment shall at all times be accorded fair and
equitable treatment, shall enjoy full protection and security and shall
in no case be accorded treatment less than that required by

1.
The term investment treaty as used herein refers to international
agreements that focus on investment (such as bilateral investment treaties (BITs)), as
well as trade or sectoral agreements that include an investment chapter (such as free
trade agreements or the Energy Charter Treaty). E.g., Energy Charter Treaty, opened
for signatureDec. 17, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 381 (1995).
2.
See Stephan W. Schill, Enhancing International Investment Law's
Legitimacy: Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of a New Public Law
Approach, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 57, 62 (2011) (observing that investment treaties generally
grant foreign investors a multitude of substantive rights and allow investors to enforce
them in arbitration against the host state); see also RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH
SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 220-28 (2008) (noting

that providing a private right of action to enforce rights under international law is a
key innovation of investment treaties, and discussing the arbitration mechanisms that
they typically make available).
3.
DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 2, at 149-51 (noting that most investment
treaties contain protection and security clauses, and discussing varying conceptions of
what they require).
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international law."'4 Other treaties refer instead to "constant
protection and security," "constant security and protection," orrarely-"protection and legal security. '5 Moreover, some non-U.S.
provisions make no mention of "fair and equitable treatment" or of
international law, 6 and a few. seem to subsume the protection and7
security standard within the concept of fair and equitable treatment.
Tribunals and commentators are divided over whether the basic
notion of protection and security requires merely that host states take
steps to shield investors or their investments from physical harms, or
whether it also requires protection against nonphysical threats.8 Put
another way, does the standard require physical security only, or also
legal security? Economic security? Opinions vary widely. In recent
years, tribunals have articulated several different and conflicting
interpretations of the standard's scope. 9
There is also ongoing debate over the relationship between
protection and security and fair and equitable treatment. Some
tribunals have treated the two obligations as fully distinct, 10 while

See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection
4.
of Investment, U.S.-Arg., art. II(2)(a), Nov. 14, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 124, amended by S.
TREATY Doc. No. 103-2 (1993) [hereinafter U.S.-Argentina BIT] (emphasis added),
available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/43475.pdf.
5.
For illustrations of the variations among protection and security clauses,
see ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUiS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT
TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 308 (2009) and KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE,
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: HISTORY, POLICY, AND INTERPRETATION 244 (2010).
6.
NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supranote 5, at 308.
7.
See id. at 313 (discussing a treaty between France and Argentina that
requires "protection and full security in accordance with the principle of fair and
equitable treatment"(emphasis added)).
See VANDEVELDE, supra note 5, at 244 ("[A]n emerging issue raised by this
8.
standard is whether it imposes liability for nonphysical harm to investment.").
9.
For decisions holding that protection and security is limited to physical
security, see, for example, Suez v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17,
Decision on Liability, 11 167-69 (July 30, 2010); Saluka Invs. BV v. Czech Republic,
ICGJ 368, Partial Award, 7 483-84 (PCA 2006); BG Grp. Plc. v. Republic of Arg.,
Final Award, IT 324-26 (UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. 2007). For decisions holding that the
standard extends to legal as well as physical security, see, for example, AES Summit
Generation Ltd. v. Republic of Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, Award, 13.3.2
(Sept. 23, 2010); Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12,
Annulment Proceeding, IT 310-11 (July 14, 2006); Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co.
v. Republic of Ecuador (Oxy 1), LCIA Case No. UN3467, Award, IT 183, 187 (London
Ct. Int'l Arb. 2004); CME Czech Republic BV v. Czech Republic, Partial Award,
IT 159-60 (UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. 2001); Lauder v. Czech Republic, Final Award, 308
(UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. 2001). In addition, at least one tribunal has held that the
standard also contemplates "commercial" security. Biwater Gauff (Tanz.) Ltd. v. United
729 (July 24, 2008). Unless
Republic of Tanz., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award,
otherwise indicated, all arbitral awards cited herein may be downloaded via
http://italaw.com.
See, e.g., Enron Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3,
10.
Award, 77 251-68 & 284-86 (May 22, 2007), 19 World Trade & Arb. Materials 109
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others have conflated them,1 1 and still others have discussed the two
standards
in tandem
without explaining
their apparent
12
relationship.
Both of these controversies surrounding protection and security
have key significance for international investment law. On the one
hand, if the standard is construed to require a broad form of legal or
commercial security, then host states could face troubling constraints
on their sovereign prerogatives. It may be difficult for tribunals to
draw a consistent line between permissible modifications of national
law or regulatory policy and those giving rise to liability because they
are deemed to undermine the country's legal or commercial
stability. 13 States might also be found liable under a broad reading of
the standard if they contribute to, or fail to effectively manage, a
financial crisis-a risk of particular concern in light of the recent
global financial meltdown and multiplying national debt crises.
On the other hand, if protection and security is construed to
require nothing more than physical protection, then investors could
lack redress when they experience nonphysical wrongs not covered by
other standards. To date, many tribunals have avoided this risk by
interpreting fair and equitable treatment broadly enough to
compensate for any shortfalls in protection and security. Among the
concepts that tribunals have held to be implicit in fair and equitable
treatment are the obligations to make all laws, regulations, and
policies clear to foreign investors in advance; to behave in good faith
and respect an investor's legitimate expectations; to maintain a stable
and predictable legal framework; to refrain from discrimination; and
to provide due process. 14 Some contend, indeed, that fair and

(2007) (analyzing the fair and equitable treatment and protection and security claims
separately, and suggesting that it would be problematic to read the two as
overlapping).
11.
See, e.g., Oxy I, LCIA Case No. UN3467, Award, at 187 (asserting that
once a violation of fair and equitable treatment is found, "the question of whether in
addition there has been a breach of full protection and security under this Article
becomes moot as a treatment that is not fair and equitable automatically entails an
absence of full protection and security").
12.
See, e.g., Sergei Paushok v. Mongolia, Award, 327 (UNCITRAL Arb. Trib.
2011) (finding that neither the protection and security clause nor the fair and equitable
treatment clause were violated).
13.
Notably, tribunals in two separate cases arising from the same facts agreed
that protection and security extends to legal security, but differed over whether a
particular legal amendment violated the standard. Compare CME, Partial Award, at
159, 601, 613 (concluding the Czech Republic violated a protection and security
provision by amending a Media Law to the disadvantage of an investor), with Lauder,
Final Award, at
308-314 (concluding the amendment did not violate protection and
security).
14.
See Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on
Jurisdiction and Liability,
284 (Jan. 14, 2010) (interpreting fair and equitable
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equitable treatment has become a sort of "catch all" standard, capable
of covering any conduct that strikes the arbitrators as unjust or
15
unwarranted.
Meanwhile, some tribunals have used the breadth of fair and
equitable treatment (as they interpret it) as part of their rationale for
rejecting a wider reading of protection and security, contending that
the latter standard must be limited to physical protection because,
were it construed more broadly, it would encroach on the role they
have ascribed to fair and equitable treatment.1 6 But even setting
aside the tautological nature of this reasoning, this approach to
interpreting the two standards has come at a serious cost. The
breadth of fair and equitable treatment as interpreted by these
tribunals-appearing to some to have been manufactured out of
whole cloth and to have no foundation in customary international
law-has contributed to a perception that investment treaties impose
17
a troubling and unprecedented constraint on national sovereignty.
This, in turn, has prompted some to question the legitimacy of
investment treaty arbitration and the wisdom of signing investment

treatment as encompassing all of these concepts); DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 2,
at 130-47 (summarizing the jurisprudence involving fair and equitable treatment).
15.
See FIONA MARSHALL, INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., FAIR AND
EQUITABLE TREATMENT IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 2, 7 (2007),

available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2OO7/inv_fair-treatment.pdf (asserting that
governments are concerned that expansive readings of fair and equitable treatment
give "a tribunal so much discretion that the process resembles a decision ex aequo et
bono, i.e. a decision based solely on the arbitrators' subjective view of 'fairness' and
'equity,"' and that fair and equitable treatment risks becoming "a 'catch all' provision
capable of being invoked in respect of virtually any adverse treatment of an

investment"); Matthew T. Parish & Charles B. Rosenberg, An Introduction to the
Energy Charter Treaty, 20 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 191, 203 (2009) (summarizing fair and
equitable treatment jurisprudence and concluding that "any intrinsically unfair action

of government that offends principles of natural justice or proper dealing may infringe
the standard").
16.
See, e.g., Suez v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision
on Liability,
167-68 (July 30, 2010) (asserting that it would be inappropriate to
interpret protection and security as extending to legal security because this would
"result in an overlap with other standards of investment protection," including fair and
equitable treatment).
17.
See, e.g., INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., PRIVATE RIGHTS, PUBLIC
PROBLEMS: A GUIDE TO NAFTA'S CONTROVERSIAL CHAPTER ON INVESTOR RIGHTS 28-29

(2001), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/trade-citizensguide.pdf

(arguing that

decisions interpreting fair and equitable treatment broadly have imposed on host

states "standards never before made applicable in domestic law or international law,"
and that-if these are not more precisely defined-they may inhibit host states "when
acting to protect the public good'); GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY
ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 88-89 (2007) (asserting that expansive readings of the
standard have gone "well beyond customary international law" and that "[t]he
readiness of tribunals to adopt such an expansive interpretation has major implications
for governments," which now face "an all-encompassing guarantee of highly flexible

notions of fairness, equity, and due process").
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treaties.18 This threat to legitimacy might be alleviated to some
extent if arbitrators did not have to rely on a single, amorphous
standard to address such a broad range of nonphysical risks, and if it
could be shown that fair and equitable treatment and protection and
security are both solidly grounded in customary international law.
Moreover, the very fact that tribunals have offered such
divergent interpretations of protection and security has caused
further damage to the legitimacy of investment treaty arbitration. 19
Conflicting decisions create the impression that the law in this area is
in disarray and make it difficult for investors and governments to
evaluate their rights and obligations and conduct themselves
accordingly. 20 This threat to legitimacy, too, could be addressed if the
nature of the standard could be ascertained definitively.
Some countries, including the United States, have attempted to
resolve the controversies by providing greater specificity in their most
recent investment treaties. For example, the four new U.S.
investment treaties ratified in 2011 all provide that "protection and
security" and "fair and equitable treatment" are intended to express,
and are collectively limited to, "the customary international law
minimum standard of treatment of aliens" 21-i.e., the minimum

18.
See, e.g., SCHILL, supra note 2, at 63 (noting that "the breadth of some
interpretations of investors' rights by some arbitral tribunals" has attracted criticism
from states and scholars and contributed to "a veritable 'legitimacy crisis,"' as
evidenced by the recent withdrawal of some Latin American states from investment
instruments); M. Sornarajah, A Coming Crisis: Expansionary Trends in Investment
Treaty Arbitration, in APPEALS MECHANISM IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES
39, 40, 66 (Karl P. Sauvant & Michael Chiswick-Patterson eds., 2008) (asserting that
"the expansionary attitudes taken by arbitrators" are illegitimate, and have led many
countries to question "whether the advantages of entering into investment treaties
outweigh their potential advantages").
19.
See Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty
Arbitration: Privatizing Public InternationalLaw Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1558, 1563 (2005) (discussing the damage to legitimacy caused
by inconsistent decisions, including those concerning the protection and security
standard).
20.
See id. at 1558 ("Inconsistency creates uncertainty and damages the
legitimate expectations of investors and Sovereigns."); Nienke Grossman, Legitimacy
and InternationalAdjudicative Bodies, 41 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 107, 150 (2009)
(arguing that inconsistent applications of a single rule in similar situations make it
difficult for those governed by the rule to modify their behavior to accord with it, and
leads to a perception that the dispute resolution mechanism is arbitrary and
ineffective).
21.
Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Colom., art. 10.5(2), Nov. 22, 2006 [hereinafter
U.S.-Colombia FTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-tradeagreements/colombia-fta/final-text; Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Kor., art. 11.5(2), June
30, 2007 [hereinafter U.S.-Korea FTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-ftafinal-text; Trade Promotion Agreement,
U.S.-Pan., art. 10.5(2), June 28, 2007 [hereinafter U.S.-Panama FTA], available at
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/panama-tpa/final-text;
Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-
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protection offered by general international law. 22 These treaties add
that "protection and security," in particular, requires only "the level
of police protection required under customary international law"23-a
definition that would seem to limit the standard to physical security.
The same approach is employed in the most recent iteration of the
U.S. Model BIT, adopted in 2012.24
While drafting measures such as these may resolve the
controversies surrounding protection and security with regard to
newly concluded treaties, the overwhelming majority of treaties in
force contain no such definitions, and the controversies remain very
much alive with respect to them. Moreover, it is worth questioning
whether the drafting approach taken in these recent U.S. treaties is
the optimal one.
Despite the stakes riding on these controversies, surprisingly
little has been written about the protection and security standard in
an effort to resolve them. 25 One scholar has aptly described the
literature on the standard as "scarce,"26 and what has been written
has not taken advantage of the full range of interpretive tools offered
by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which
addresses the interpretation of treaties. 27 In particular, little has
been written about the significance of the purpose of investment
treaties or of the context of protection and security clauses within
treaties. Existing literature and case law also reflects only limited
research into general rules of international law that shed light on the
meaning of the standard, and into the origins and drafting history of
the relevant provisions. It has been frequently observed that modern
protection and security clauses are derived from similar provisions in

Rwanda, art. 5, Feb. 19, 2008 [hereinafter U.S.-Rwanda BIT], available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreementslbit/asseLupload-file743-145
23.pdf.
The international minimum standard is discussed in detail infra Parts
22.
III.B.1, III.E.2. For more on the standard, see NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 5, at
11-15.
23.
U.S.-Colombia FTA, supra note 21, art. 10.5(2)(b) (emphasis added); U.S.Korea FTA, supra note 21, art. 11.5(2)(b) (emphasis added); U.S.-Panama FTA, supra
note 21, art. 10.5(2)(b) (emphasis added); U.S.-Rwanda BIT, supranote 21, art. 5(2)(b).
24.
U.S Model Bilateral Investment Treaty Concerning the Encouragement
and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, art. 5(2), 2012 [hereinafter 2012 U.S. Model
BIT], availableat http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf.
25.
See CHRISTOPHER F. DUGAN ET AL., INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 532
(2008) (asserting that protection and security is "one of the more venerable
international obligations contained in treaties relating to the treatment of foreigners
and their property," but that "far more attention in recent years has been given to
other standards of treatment").
26.
Giuditta Cordero Moss, Full Protection and Security, in STANDARDS OF
INVESTMENT PROTECTION 131, 131 (August Reinisch ed., 2008).
27.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 (entered into force January 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
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older U.S. friendship, commerce, and navigation (FCN) treaties, 28 but
the origin of those FCN treaty provisions-and how they were
understood when adopted-has not been explored in depth.
A clearer picture of protection and security and its relationship
to other standards begins to emerge upon a more extensive inquiry
into each of the foregoing. Among other things, it becomes clear that
U.S. treaty negotiators have long viewed protection and security
clauses as expressing a norm of customary international law, which
addresses a range of potential threats to foreigners, not merely
physical ones. 29 While physical threats have always posed the gravest
risk to merchants or investors in a foreign land, certain other serious
risks have existed as well. These include, inter alia, the possibility
that the foreigner could be defrauded or denied recovery of just debts,
that the host state could apply its laws in an arbitrary or
discriminatory way, or that the foreigner's property could be
expropriated without compensation. As discussed in greater detail
below in Part III, numerous FCN treaties and such learned
authorities as Christian Wolff, Emmerich de Vattel, Alexander
Hamilton, James Kent, Lassa Oppenheim, Elihu Root, and Andreas
Roth have referred to a duty of "protection" or "security" under
international law to guard against precisely such risks, among others.
A review of the historical record also reveals that the fair and
equitable treatment concept, though of more recent vintage, is closely
aligned with and derived from the older notion of protection and
security. 30 In their modern senses, the two standards are best seen as
distinct but overlapping. Protection and security obliges the host
state to act with due diligence as reasonably necessary to protect
foreigners' persons and property, as well as to possess and make
available an adequate legal system, featuring such protections as
appropriate remedial mechanisms, due process, and a right to
compensation for expropriation. By contrast, fair and equitable
treatment concerns the manner in which the state treats the
investment when interacting with it, requiring that the state act
reasonably and in good faith. Certain conduct can potentially violate
both standards-such as a denial of justice, an arbitrary application
of the law, or intentional harassment-but the analysis under each
standard would differ. Namely, under a protection and security
analysis, these acts would be wrongful because they would reflect the
lack of an adequate legal system or a failure to act with due diligence,

28.
See, e.g., NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supranote 5, at 307.
29.
Evidence in this regard is discussed infra Part III.
30.
The origin of the fair and equitable treatment standard is discussed in
detail infra Part III.D.2.
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whereas under a fair and equitable treatment analysis, the wrong
would be a failure to treat the investment reasonably or in good faith.
As can be seen, these two standards collectively encompass many
of the notions that modern tribunals have held to be inherent in fair
and equitable treatment. Yet both standards are firmly enshrined in
customary international law, and are therefore not unprecedented or
anomalous in the slightest. Moreover, it is important to emphasize
that there have always been distinct limitations on the scope of both
duties. In particular, host states have never been obliged to ensure
the complete stability and predictability of their legal systems, which
would not only be unrealistic, but would also unduly inhibit the
31
natural evolution of national regulatory regimes.
In sum, this Article aims to recover for international investment
law the traditional meaning of protection and security under
customary international law and to demonstrate the relationship
between that notion and the standards of protection and security and
fair and equitable treatment as set forth in all but the very most
recent U.S. investment treaties. 32 It seeks to do so with a view toward
enhancing the legitimacy of international investment law and of
investment treaty arbitration.
The discussion proceeds as follows. Part II outlines the VCLT
interpretive framework and explains, preliminarily, how it should be
applied to protection and security clauses, while underscoring the
critical role assigned by that framework to general rules of
international law, preparatory work, and other evidence extrinsic to
the treaty text. Part III collects and applies such evidence.
Specifically, it traces the evolution of the protection and security
concept from the 1740s through the rise of the modern investment
treaty and identifies related diplomatic correspondence, case law, and
commentary, so as to arrive at a more reliable interpretation of the

31.
See Feldman v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award, 103, (Dec.
16, 2002), 7 ICSID Rep. 341 (2003) (arguing that "governments must be free to act in
the broader public interest" through reasonable modifications of their laws without
incurring liability to a foreign investor, and that "it is safe to say that customary
international law recognizes this" (emphasis added)). Several modern treaty tribunals
have also emphasized that investment treaties are not intended to serve as insurance
policies against any adverse development, legal or otherwise. See, e.g., EDF (Servs.)
Ltd. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, Award, 217 (Oct. 8, 2009), available at
https:((icsid.worldbank.org[ICSID/FrontServlet ("Except where specific promises or
representations are made by the State to the investor, the latter may not rely on a
bilateral investment treaty as a kind of insurance policy against the risk of any
changes in the host State's legal and economic framework. Such expectation would be
neither legitimate nor reasonable.").
32.
This Article focuses on the nature of the standard in U.S. investment
treaties, although it likely has a similar meaning in other treaties, given that all
protection and security provisions derive from U.S. precedent. See NEWCOMBE &
PARADELL, supra note 5, at 307.
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standard. Part IV employs that interpretation as the lens through
which to critique modern treaty jurisprudence, as well as the United
States' current approach to drafting protection and security clauses.
Part V concludes.

II.

INTERPRETING PROTECTION AND SECURITY CLAUSES UNDER

THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES FRAMEWORK

It is widely accepted that the VCLT outlines the appropriate
methods for interpreting any agreement between states. It codifies a
number of principles of customary international law and is routinely
relied upon by courts, tribunals, and scholars as the authoritative
33
guide to interpreting treaties.
The provisions of the VCLT governing treaty interpretation are
found in Articles 31 and 32. Article 31 begins with the general
mandate that "[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
'34
It
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
goes on to provide that one shall also take into account any
subsequent agreement between the parties regarding treaty
interpretation, their practice in applying the treaty, as well as "any
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between
35
the parties."
Article 32, in turn, provides:
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation,
including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of
its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the
application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the
interpretation according to article 31 ....
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or

33.
See Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301, 309 (2d Cir. 2000)
(describing the VCLT as "an authoritative guide to the customary international law of
treaties"); MICHAEL BYERS, WAR LAW: UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
ARMED CONFLICT 5 (2005) (observing that the VCLT rules on treaty interpretation are
generally acknowledged as codification of customary international law and are
therefore binding even on nonsignatory nations); JAN PETER SASSE, AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 60 (2011) (asserting that the starting
point for most tribunals interpreting an investment treaty is Article 31 of the VCLT).
Although the United States has never ratified the VCLT, the U.S. government has
repeatedly acknowledged that most of the treaty's provisions-including those relating
to the interpretation of treaties-are binding on all states as an authoritative
statement of customary international law. See, e.g., MARIAN NASH LEICH, OFFICE OF
THE LEGAL ADVISER, DEP'T OF STATE, 1980 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 400, 419-20 (1980).
34.
Vienna Convention, supra note 27, art. 31(1).
35.
Id. art. 31(3).
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The Parts that follow apply the foregoing interpretive framework
to protection and security provisions in U.S. investment treaties.

A. The Ordinary Meaning of "Protectionand Security"
As previously noted, Article 31 of the VCLT calls for
determination of the "ordinary meaning" of the treaty terms at
issue. 37 To ascertain that meaning, it is common for those seeking to
38
interpret treaty terms to refer to dictionary definitions.
The definitions of "protection" and "security" provided by
dictionaries vary, but those in the Oxford English Dictionary are
relatively comprehensive. That dictionary defines protection as "the
fact or condition of being protected; shelter, defence, or preservation
from harm, danger, damage, etc.; guardianship, care." 3 9 It defines "to
protect," in turn, as "[t]o defend or guard from danger or injury; to
support or assist against hostile or inimical action; to preserve from
attack, persecution, harassment, etc.; to keep safe, take care of," and
so on. 40 The same dictionary defines security to include "[t]he state or
condition of being protected from or not exposed to danger; safety,"
and "the state or condition of being ... secure," as in "[f]reedom from
danger," "freedom from care, anxiety, or apprehension," "freedom
from uncertainty or doubt," "stability," and "freedom from material or
'4 1
financial want.
The above definitions suggest that the terms protection and
security are largely synonymous and that both generally signify the

36.
Id. art. 32.
37.
Id. art. 31(1).
38.
See, e.g., MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/7, Award, 113 (May 25, 2004), available at http://www.oxfordlawreports.com/
subscriber.article?script=yes&id=/ic/Awards/law-iic-174-2004&recno=12&module=iic&
category=Chile (consulting the Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English to
determine the ordinary meaning of the words "fair" and "equitable"); Lauder v. Czech
Republic, Final Award,
221 (UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. 2001) (consulting Black's Law
Dictionary to determine the ordinary meaning of the term "arbitrary" as used in an
investment treaty).
39.
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed., 2007) [hereinafter OXFORD
DICTIONARY]; see also WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 1822 (2002) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S] (defining
"protection" as "the act of protecting: the state or fact of being protected: shelter from
danger or harm").
40.
OXFORD DICTIONARY, supra note 39; see also WEBSTER'S, supra note 39
(defining "protect" as "to cover or shield from that which would injure, destroy or
detrimentally affect: secure or preserve").
41.
OXFORD DICTIONARY, supra note 39; see also WEBSTER'S, supra note 39, at
2053 (defining "security" as "the quality or state of being secure," as in "freedom from
danger," "freedom from fear, anxiety, or care," "freedom from uncertainty or doubt,"
and "dependability, stability").
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act or status of being shielded from threats or risks, which can be of a
physical, legal, financial, or even emotional nature, depending on the
context.
Not surprisingly, therefore, several tribunals have noted that the
phrase is capable of being used in relation to harms of a nonphysical
nature. For example, in National Grid v. Argentina, the tribunal
found that a clause in the UK-Argentina BIT requiring "protection
and constant security" contemplated legal as well as physical
security. 42 As part of its reasoning, the tribunal observed that the
terms "protection" and "security" are capable of covering nonphysical
treaty in no way restricted the standard to
harms and that the
43
physical protection.
Similarly, in Azurix v. Argentina, the tribunal noted that the
terms in their ordinary meaning are broad enough to cover more than
physical harms and asserted that they should be read as doing so, at
least when preceded by a modifier such as "full" (as in "full protection
44
and security").
The tribunal in Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania endorsed the Azurix
reasoning and went even further, asserting that the language
in a secure environment, both
"implies a State's guarantee of stability
'4 5
physical, commercial and legal.
Nevertheless, several other tribunals have viewed the obligation
of protection and security as limited to physical protection, even when
'46
And to be sure, the
modified by a term such as "full" or "constant.
mere fact that the terms are capable of covering nonphysical harms
does not mean they are used in that sense in a particular treaty. To
be confident about which types of threats or risks the terms
contemplate in a treaty, one must look further.

See Nat'l Grid P.L.C. v. Argentina, Case 1:09-cv-00248-RBW, Award,
42.
187-89 (UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. 2008) (holding changes in a regulatory framework
that created uncertainty were contrary to the protection and security obligation).
Id.
43.
Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12,
44.
Annulment Proceeding, 408 (July 14, 2006).
Biwater Gauff (Tanz.) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanz., ICSID Case No.
45.
ARB/05/22, Award, 729 (July 24, 2008) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Suez v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision
46.
167-69 (July 30, 2010) ("[The full protection and security standard
on Liability,
primarily seeks to protect investment from physical harm."); Saluka Invs. BV v. Czech
Republic, ICGJ 368, Partial Award, 77 483-84 (PCA 2006) (arguing that the protection
and security clause is only meant to cover the "physical integrity of an investment
against interference by use of force"); BG Grp. Plc. v. Republic of Arg., Final Award,
324 (UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. 2007) (asserting that full protection and security is
usually associated with the physical security of the investor and his investment).
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B. The Object and Purpose of Investment Treaties
Article 31 of the VCLT also calls for a term to be interpreted in
47
light of the "object and purpose" of the treaty in which it appears.
This refers to the "reasons for which the treaty exists"-sometimes
termed as the ratio legis or the treaty's raison d16tre-from the
perspective of the treaty parties. 48 In ascertaining the object and
49
purpose, the treaty's title and preamble often provide key clues.
In this case, the titles of many investment treaties signal that
their purpose is to provide enhanced protection for investment, with a
view toward promoting investment by nationals of one party into the
territory of the other. Notably, U.S. BITs are consistently entitled
"Treaty... Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection
of Investment.""a
Preambles typically record a similar purpose. For example, the
preamble to the U.S. BIT with the Democratic Republic of the Congo
notes that the parties concluded the treaty "to promote greater
economic cooperation between them, with respect to investment by
nationals and companies of each Party in the territory of the other
Part," based on their expectation that "the treatment to be accorded
such investment will stimulate the flow of private capital and the
economic development of the Parties."51 Many other preambles
include similar language, and it is widely recognized that this
52
accurately reflects the purpose of investment treaties.
Further insight into the purpose of U.S. investment treaties can
be gleaned from the letters that accompany a treaty when submitted
by the State Department to the President. For example, the letter of
submittal associated with the first U.S. BIT ever signed (with
Panama in 1982) observed that the purpose of the then-new U.S. BIT
program was "to encourage and protect U.S. investment in developing

47.

Vienna Convention, supra note 27, art. 31(1).

48.
ULF LINDERFALK, ON THE INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES: THE MODERN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS EXPRESSED IN THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
TREATIES 204-05 (2007).

49
NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 5, at 113 ("Many tribunals have
sought to interpret [International Investment Agreements] on the basis of their object
and purpose, typically by looking at their titles and preambles.").
50.
See, e.g., U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 4 (emphasis added).
51.
Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of
Investment, U.S.-Congo, pmbl., Feb. 12, 1990, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 102-1 (1991).
52.
See, e.g., DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 2, at 21-22 (noting that the
preambles of investment treaties often address their purpose, and concluding from
these that "the purpose of investment treaties is to address the typical risks of a longterm investment project, and thereby to provide for stability and predictability in the
sense of an investment-friendly climate"); VANDEVELDE, supra note 5, at 57 (asserting
that countries have concluded BITs on the premise that "offering a secure legal
framework for foreign investment would induce foreign investors to invest").
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countries. By providing certain mutual guarantees and protection, a

BIT creates a more stable and predictable legal framework for foreign
investors in each of the treaty Parties. '53 The letter added that this
BIT, and others then under consideration, were
consistent in purpose with the network of treaties of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation ... which the United States negotiated from
the early y]ears of the Republic until the last successful negotiations
with Thailand and Togo in the late 1960s. They continue the U.S. policy
of securing by agreement standards of equitable treatment and
protection of U.S. citizens carrying on business abroad, and
institutionalizing processes for the settlement of disputes between
54
investors and host countries, and between governments.

To date, the tribunals and scholars offering interpretations of
protection and security clauses have identified few insights to be
gleaned from such evidence of the object and purpose of investment
treaties. Although it is common for tribunals to consider evidence of
this nature when interpreting fair and equitable treatment-and to
conclude that one of the elements of that standard is to require a
stable and predictable legal environment 5 5-they rarely draw similar
conclusions about protection and security.
One of the few instances in which a tribunal has referred to the
object and purpose of the treaty when interpreting a protection and
security clause can be seen in the first known investment treaty
arbitration, Asian Agricultural Products, Ltd. v. Republic of Sri
Lanka (AAPL).56 This was a case filed by a Hong Kong investor under
the UK-Sri Lanka BIT, at a time when the treaty covered investors
from Hong Kong. 57 The claimant alleged that Sri Lanka violated a
provision of the treaty requiring "full protection and security" by
failing to prevent the destruction of the claimant's shrimp farm and
the deaths of several of the claimant's employees during a clash
between the Sri Lankan military and Tamil Tiger rebels. 58 The
claimant argued further that the standard imposed a duty of strict
59
liability on Sri Lanka to prevent harms to covered investments.

53.
Letter of Submittal for Treaty Concerning the Treatment and Protection of
Investments, U.S.-Pan., Oct. 27, 1982, S. TREATY DOC. No. 99-2 [hereinafter Panama
Letter of Submittal] (emphasis added), available at http://www.sice.oas.orgfInvestmentl
BITSbyCountry/BITs/PANUSA_1982_e.asp.
54.
Id. (emphasis added).
55.
See, e.g., CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/8, Award, 274 (May 12, 2005), 44 I.L.M. 1205 (2005) (concluding a stable
legal and business environment is an essential element of fair and equitable treatment
based on objectives of the Treaty).
56.
Asian Agric. Prods. Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka (AAPL), ICSID Case No.
ARB/87/3, Final Award, 1 51 (June 27, 1990), 30 I.L.M. 580 (1991).
57.
Id. at 580-81.
58.
Id. at 581-82.
59.

Id. at 583-84, 588.
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In evaluating this claim, the tribunal observed that the "proper
interpretation [of the protection and security clause] has to take into
account the realization of the Treaty's general spirit and objectives,
which is clearly in the present case the encouragement of investments
through securing an adequate environment of legal protection."60 The
tribunal added that it did not necessarily follow from this purpose,
however, that the parties intended the standard to impose strict
liability and asserted that reading the treaty in such a way would be
inappropriate absent supporting drafting history or other preparatory
work. 6 1 The tribunal accordingly concluded that the duty of protection
and security in the BIT required only "due diligence" in protecting 2the
6
investment, not an absolute guarantee that no harm would occur.
It bears noting that while the tribunal in AAPL did not explicitly
state that the protection and security standard extends beyond
physical protection (an issue it had no need to reach because the case
before it involved physical harm), it clearly acknowledged in the
above-quoted language that the treaty's purpose was to "secur[e] an
adequate environment of legal protection," and felt this was relevant
63
to interpreting the standard.
The AAPL tribunal was correct in this regard, but more can be
said on the subject. To begin with, the references to protection and
treatment in the preambles of BITs signal that the protection and
security and fair and equitable treatment standards expressed in the
body of the treaty are both directly connected to the treaty's purpose.
After all, the typical treaty begins with a statement that the parties
are concluding the treaty in order to secure enhanced protection and
treatment for investment-including an enhanced legal frameworkand this is soon followed by clauses whereby the parties undertake to
provide "full" protection (and security) and "fair and equitable"
treatment. This suggests that the parties intend these standards to
give legal substance to the aspirations expressed in the preamble, i.e.,
to convert the goals of the treaty into obligations. Furthermore, the
assertion in letters of submittal that "[b]y providing certain mutual
guarantees and protection, a BIT creates a more stable and
predictable legal framework for foreign investors" seems to confirm
that the notion of protection in the protection and security clause
64
contemplates some form of legal protection.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 601 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 602, 612.
Id. at 601 (emphasis added).
Panama Letter of Submittal, supra note 53 (emphasis added).
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C. The Context of Protectionand Security Clauses
Article 31 of the VCLT indicates that a term must be read in its
context within the treaty, including any related annexes or
agreements.6 5 Context in this sense includes the grammatical
construction of the provision within which the term appears, and66 the
location of the term within the structure of the treaty as a whole.
Most U.S. BITs in force begin with a preamble, followed by a
definitions section, followed by a substantive section, followed by
language on dispute resolution, treaty termination, and other
nonsubstantive matters.67
The first article of the substantive section, Article II, sets forth
various broad undertakings regarding the treatment and protection
to be accorded to investment. Specifically, it refers to an obligation to
treat investments of companies or nationals of the other party no less
favorably than investments of the party's own nationals or of third
country nationals. 68 (This is commonly referred to as "national
treatment" and "most-favored-nation treatment," respectively. 69)
Next come commitments to provide fair and equitable treatment and
protection and security. 70 These commitments are followed by
undertakings to refrain from arbitrary or discriminatory impairment
of investments 7 1 and to observe obligations that may have been
72
entered into with regard to investments.
After that language comes a litany of more specific substantive
provisions, dealing with such matters as
means of asserting
an obligation to provide effective
73
claims and enforcing rights;
an obligation to make public all laws, regulations,
administrative policies, 74and adjudicatory decisions
pertaining to investment;
compensation for expropriation; 75 and
compensation for losses incurred in connection with
"war or other armed conflict, revolution, state of

65.

Vienna Convention, supra note 27, art. 31(1)-(2).

66.

RICHARD K. GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 178, 182 (2008).

67.
68.

See, e.g., U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 4.
See, e.g., id. art. 11(2)(a).

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 2, at 178-79, 186-87.
See, e.g., U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 4, art. II(2)(a).
See, e.g., id. art. II(2)(b).
See, e.g., id. art. I(2)(c).
See, e.g., id. art. 11(6).
See, e.g., id. art. 11(7).
See, e.g., id. art. IV(1).
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national emergency, insurrection, civil disturbance or
76
other similar events."
The foregoing treaty structure is consistent with the tentative
reading of the protection and security and fair and equitable
treatment standards suggested above in Part II.B. In particular, the
placement of these standards at the beginning of the substantive
section (together with other language regarding the treatment of
investment) suggests that they may be intended as general,
overarching obligations committing each party to provide the sort of
protection and treatment necessary to stimulate further investment.
These obligations are then seemingly fleshed out by the more specific
provisions that follow. Thus, for example, the effective means,
transparency, expropriation, and war and civil disturbance clauses
may all be designed to elucidate aspects of the protection and security
and fair and equitable treatment to be provided.
If, by contrast, the notion of protection and security was intended
as a narrow standard requiring nothing more than physical
protection, then one would expect it to appear later in the treaty,
amongst other subsidiary obligations. One might expect it to appear
in particular in the same article as the war and civil disturbances
clause, which deals with the consequences of physical harms. That it
does not so appear is likely no coincidence.
D. Relevant Rules of InternationalLaw
In ascertaining the meaning of a term used in a treaty, the VCLT
calls for one to consult any relevant rules of international law
applicable between the parties. 7 Thus, for example, if there are
customary norms that govern states' obligations toward foreigners,
these may offer insight into the nature of obligations toward
foreigners expressed in an investment treaty.
There certainly are such general rules of international law,
including the "international minimum standard" referenced in recent
U.S. investment treaties. Yet one should not be too quick to draw
connections between a treaty standard and a general rule of
international law when the latter is not explicitly referenced. As
Christoph Schreuer has pointed out, the parties may have intended to
lay down an autonomous standard, i.e., one that is independent of
whatever rules exist under customary international law. 78 Schreuer

76.
See, e.g., id. art. IV(3).
77.
Vienna Convention, supra note 27, art. 31(3).
78.
Christoph Schreuer, Full Protection and Security, 1 J. INT'L DISP.
SETTLEMENT 353, 364 (2010). Other authorities making this point are discussed infra
Part III.E.2.
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has cautioned in particular against equating protection and security
with the international minimum standard because "it is hard to see
why the drafters of a treaty would use 'full protection and security'
where they mean the 'minimum standard under customary
international law.' 79 In other words, if the parties wished to refer to
a customary norm, it would be logical to mention it by name. This is a
clever argument, but the conclusion would not follow if it could be
shown that the term protection and security has its own established
meaning in customary international law as an element of--or
alternative label for-the international minimum standard. In that
event, in requiring protection and security, the parties would have
referred to a general rule by name. As it turns out, that is precisely
the case.
Indeed, a number of investment treaty tribunals have noted that
customary international law includes an obligation of protection
toward foreigners and have drawn a connection between that duty
and the treaty standard of protection and security. The tribunal in
AAPL is an example. In evaluating the claimant's protection and
security claim, the tribunal identified various historical authorities
referring to a customary duty to "protect" aliens according to a "due
diligence" standard and drew a connection between that duty and the
treaty standard.8 0 The cases to which AAPL referred involved
physical harms inflicted upon foreigners, which was only natural
considering that AAPL itself involved a physical attack on the
claimant's property and personnel. Nevertheless, as will be seen, that
AAPL focused on that authority helped give rise to an impression that
the customary duty of protection is limited to the physical context.
This impression was reinforced when the next two cases to
equate a treaty standard of protection and security with the
customary duty-American Manufacturing & Trading, Inc. (AMT) v.
Republic of Zaires l and Wena Hotels, Ltd. v. Arab Republic of
Egypt 82-ikewise
involved physical interferences with investments.
After those cases, several tribunals and scholars concluded that the
customary duty is limited to preventing physical harm. For example,
in Saluka Investments B. V. v. Czech Republic, the tribunal cited AMT
and Wena Hotels before asserting that "[t]he practice of arbitral
tribunals seems to indicate ... that the 'full security and protection'
clause is not meant to cover just any kind of impairment of an

79.
Schreuer, supranote 78, at 364.
80.
Asian Agric. Prods. Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka (AAPL), ICSID Case No.
ARB/87/3, Final Award,
69-77 (June 27, 1990), 30 I.L.M. 580 (1991).
81.
Am. Mfg. & Trading Inc. (AMT) v. Republic of Zaire, ICSID Case No.
ARB/93/1, Award, 6.04 (Feb. 10, 1997), 36 I.L.M. 1531, 1548-49 (1997).
82.
Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4,
Award, 79, 80-95 (Dec. 8, 2002), 41 I.L.M. 896, 911-14 (2002).
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investor's investment, but to protect more specifically the physical

83
integrity of an investment against interference by use of force."
Similarly, in BG Group v.Argentina, the tribunal summarized
the same jurisprudence (by that time augmented by Saluka as well),
and relied upon it to conclude that "notions of 'protection and
constant security' or 'full protection and security' in international law
have traditionally been associated with situations where the physical
'8 4
security of the investor or its investment is compromised.
Indeed, when other tribunals have taken a different view of
protection and security-interpreting the standard as requiring legal
as well as physical security-their faithfulness to the "traditional"
understanding of the concept has sometimes been called into
question. For example, one scholar commented in relation to one such
award, in CME Czech Republic BV v. Czech Republic,8 5 that the
tribunal "did not give any clear reason as to why it was departing
from the historical interpretation traditionally employed by courts
and tribunals and choosing to expand the concept to cover non'8 6
physical actions and injuries.
It is unfortunate that this common impression of the customary
duty has not yet been subjected to closer scrutiny. As discussed below
in Part III-which explores the historical evolution of the notion of
protection and security in customary international law and its
parallel development in U.S. treaty practice-that impression is
mistaken.

E. Supplementary Means of Interpretation
The VCLT also provides that "recourse may be had to
supplementary means of interpretation," including "preparatory
work" (also known as travauxprdparatoires)and the circumstances in
which the treaty was signed. 87 There is a debate over precisely when
one may resort to supplementary means,88 but it is undisputed that

83.
Saluka Invs. BV v. Czech Republic, ICGJ 368, Partial Award, 484 (PCA
2006).
84.
BG Grp. Plc. v. Republic of Arg., Final Award, T 324 (UNCITRAL Arb. Trib.
2007) (emphasis added); see also Enron Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/3, Award, T 286 (May 22, 2007), 19 World Trade & Arb. Materials 109 (2007)
("There is no doubt that historically this particular standard [of protection and
security] has been developed in the context of physical protection and security of the
company's officials, employees or facilities.").
85.
CME Czech Republic BV v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, 77 159-60
(UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. 2001).
86.

JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 214 (2010)

(emphasis added).
87.
Vienna Convention, supra note 27, art. 32.
88.
Compare LINDERFALK, supra note 48, at 236-37 (arguing that
supplementary means may be consulted only if the meaning suggested by the primary

2012]

RECOVERING "PROTECTIONAND SECURITY1

1115

one may consult supplementary means at least to confirm a meaning
suggested by the primary means, or when the primary means leave
some degree of ambiguity or obscurity, which is often the case.8 9
Furthermore, it is widely recognized that whatever the role
formally assigned by the VCLT to supplementary means, courts and
tribunals routinely consult them in practice to the extent they are
available. As one scholar has put it, "the parties to a dispute will
always refer the tribunal to the travaux and the tribunal will
inevitably consider them along with all the other material put before
90
it."
The notion of preparatory work covers not only drafts of the
treaty at issue, but also correspondence between the parties during
negotiations 9' and "[c]ommentaries, explanatory reports, and similar
documents ...written at the same time as a treaty is being drawn
up."'92 And the phrase "circumstances of the treaty's conclusion" refers
to the factual and legal background against which the treaty was
concluded, or, more specifically, factors that influenced the conclusion
of the treaty. 93 Such circumstances may include other treaties that
have a similar subject matter or employ similar terminology. 94 In the
present context, this would include other treaties dealing with
investment, such as FCN treaties.
Moreover, Article 32 does not limit the permissible
supplementary means to preparatory work and the circumstances of
the treaty's conclusion. 95 Other permissible evidence would include,

means is ambiguous, unreasonable, or obscure), with Stephen Schwebel, May
Preparatory Work Be Used to Correct Rather than Confirm the 'Clear' Meaning of a
Treaty Provision?, in THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST

CENTURY 541 (1996) (arguing that supplementary means may be referenced from the
outset of the interpretive process, and employed to modify an interpretation suggested
by the primary means that appears clear).
89.
See GARDINER, supra note 66, at 328 (discussing how supplementary means
of interpretation may be used when ambiguity remains after grammatical construction
within the context of the provision and the treaty as a whole).
90.

ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 245 (2d ed. 2007); see

also GARDINER, supra note 66, at 326 ('The term 'confirm' in article 32 is very loosely
interpreted in practice, reference to preparatory work and circumstances of conclusion
being made to substantiate an interpretation that is emerging as much as confirming
one which is already pretty much clear.").
91.
LINDERFALK, supra note 48, at 240.
92.
GARDINER, supra note 66, at 346.
93.
See LINDERFALK, supra note 48, at 246.
94.
See GARDINER, supra note 66, at 345 (discussing how courts and tribunals
will often draw comparisons between the treaty at issue and other treatiesparticulary when they address similar subject matter).
95.
See id. at 343 (noting that permissible supplementary means are not
limited to the examples provided in the VCLT text).
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for example, statements by a party in connection with the ratification
96
of the treaty, such as letters of submittal.
It is therefore appropriate to consider any and all of the above
categories of evidence to the extent they can be located, with a view
toward understanding the notion of protection and security expressed
in modern investment treaties. Such evidence will accordingly be
collected and discussed in Part III.

III. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF PROTECTION AND SECURITY IN
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND U.S. TREATY PRACTICE
Part II revealed that the ordinary meaning of the phrase
protection and security, the object and purpose of investment treaties,
and the context of protection and security clauses within treaties all
suggest a reading that contemplates at least some form of legal
security. Nevertheless, one must also consider relevant rules of
international law, including the customary norm of protection that
has been referenced-but not fully explored-in cases such as AAPL.
One must also consider what light, if any, supplementary means of
interpretation shed on the matter.
Evidence regarding each of the foregoing is therefore developed
in the subparts that follow, as part of a broader discussion of the
historical evolution of the protection and security standard in
customary international law and U.S. treaty practice. This evidence
strongly supports an interpretation of the standard that extends
beyond physical protection, requiring, among other things, the
existence of a legal system that offers such features as access to
courts, due process, and compensation for expropriation.
A. The Eighteenth Century
A distinct obligation of protection or security owed by a state to
foreigners in its territory had coalesced in customary international
law at least by the mid-eighteenth century and found detailed
expression in the writings of both Christian Wolff and Emmerich de
Vattel. This notion was then invoked in U.S. commercial treaties
concluded in the final decades of that century: the first protection and
security clauses.

96.

LINDERFALK, supranote 48, at 249.
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Wolff and Vattel

In 1749, Wolff, a German professor, published The Law of
Nations Treated According to a Scientific Method,9 7 which discussed
at length an obligation of "protection" and "security" owed by a host
state to foreigners under interiiational law. In particular, in a section
entitled "Of the assurance of security to foreigners in one's territory,"
Wolff observed that "[f]oreigners, as long as they live in alien
territory, ought to be safe from every injury, and the ruler of the state
is bound to defend them against it, that is, security is to be assured to
foreigners living in alien territory. '98 He added that "[t]he ruler of a
state ought not to allow any one of his subjects to cause a loss or do a
wrong to the citizen of another nation, and if this has been done, he
ought to compel him to repair the loss caused and to punish him."99
By using general terms such as "injury," "loss," and "wrong," Wolff
made clear that the duty required protection against nonphysical as
well as physical harms.
Wolff went on to explain that this duty is based on a tacit
agreement between the foreigner in question and the ruler of that
state:
[B]etween the ruler of the territory and the foreigner living in it there
exists a tacit agreement, by which the latter promises temporary
obedience, the former protection. Therefore, since tacit agreements of
that sort are to be observed, the ruler of the territory is bound to protect
foreigners, consequently not to allow them to be injured contrary to the
right common to all men by nature. But if he does not allow foreigners
living in his territory to be injured by others, he assures security to
them. Therefore, the ruler of a state is bound to assure security to
1 00
foreigners living in his territory.

Writing shortly after Wolff, in 1758, Vattel likewise
acknowledged the existence of this international duty of protection
and security in his seminal work The Law of Nations or the Principles
of Natural Law:
A sovereign may not allow the right of entrance into his territory
granted to foreigners to prove detrimental to them; in receiving them
he agrees to protect them as his own subjects and to see that they enjoy,
as far as depends on him, perfect security. Thus we see that every
sovereign who has granted asylum to a foreigner considers himself no

97.

CHRISTIAN WOLFF, JUS GENTIUM METHODO SCIENTIFICA PERTRACTATUM

(1749), reprintedin 2 THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (James Brown Scott ed.,
Joseph H. Drake trans., 1934).
98.
Id. at 536 (emphasis added).
99.
Id. (emphasis added).
100.
Id. at 537 (emphasis added).
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less offended by injuries which may be done to the foreigner than if
10 1
they were done to his own subjects.

Vattel made clear, moreover, that the "injuries" against which
states must protect foreigners are not limited to physical harms, by
noting that the state must guard against any unjust act.10 2 He added
that host states must protect not only foreigners' persons, but their
property as well, 10 3 and must provide compensation for any
expropriation. 104
Vattel's treatise on the law of nations achieved wide circulation
during the second half of the eighteenth century and was viewed by
contemporaries and subsequent generations-particularly in the
English-speaking world-as the single most useful and authoritative
expression of international law. 10 5
2.

Early U.S. Commercial Treaties

In light of the weight accorded to Vattel's writings in the late
eighteenth century, it is only natural that when the fledgling United
States began concluding commercial treaties for the benefit of its
citizens engaged in foreign commerce, those treaties explicitly
incorporated the duty of protection and security that he had
described.
The first treaty concluded by the new nation, with Prussia in
1785, included only brief and cryptic references to the protection due
to foreign merchants.10 6 Yet a treaty concluded with Great Britain a

101.
EMMERICH DE VAITEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF
NATURAL LAW (1758), reprinted in 3 THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 145 (James
Brown Scott ed., Charles G. Fenwick trans., 1916).
102.
Id. at 136 ("If a sovereign who has the power to see that his subjects act in
a just and peaceable manner permits them to injure a foreign Nation, either the State
itself or its citizens, he does no less a wrong to that Nation than if he injured it
himself.").
103.
Id. at 146.
104.
Id. at 96.
Albert de Lapradelle, Introduction to 3 THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL
105.
LAW xxxiv-xxxv (James Brown Scott ed., Charles G. Fenwick trans., 1916) (asserting
that, in Britain, "[o]f all the authors, even the English who have written upon the Law
of Nations, not one is more often nor more copiously quoted than Vattel," and that, in
the United States, Vattel has always been seen as "the most competent, the wisest, and
the safest guide, in all the discussions of Congress, in all the trials in court, and in
diplomatic correspondence, especially that concerned with questions of legality").
106.
See, e.g., Treaty of Amity and Commerce, U.S.-Prussia, art. XVIII, Sept. 10,
1785, 8 Stat. 84 ("If the citizens or subjects of either party, in danger from tempests,
pirates, enemies or other accident, shall take refuge with their vessels or effects, within
the harbours or jurisdiction of the other, they shall be received, protected and treated
with humanity and kindness ....
(emphasis added)).
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few years later, in 1794, contained more detailed references to
1 07
protection and security.
Article II provided that Britain was to withdraw its military
posts from U.S. territory but that
[a]ll settlers and traders, within the precincts or jurisdiction of the said
posts, shall continue to enjoy, unmolested, all their property of every
kind, and shall be protected therein. They shall be at full liberty to
remain there, or to remove with all or any part of their effects; and it
shall also be free to them to sell their lands, houses or effects, or to
108
retain the property thereof, at their discretion.

This use of the term protected connotes not only physical protection,
but also the status of having secure property rights under the law.
Article XIV set forth a general guarantee of "reciprocal and
perfect liberty of commerce and navigation," then specified that "[t]he
people and inhabitants of the two countries respectively, shall have
liberty freely and securely ....to hire and possess houses and warehouses for the purposes of their commerce, and generally the
merchants and traders on each side, shall enjoy the most complete
protection and security for their commerce."10 9 This use of protection
and security seems to connote at least in part an absence of undue or
discriminatory legal restrictions on foreign merchants' activities.
Article XIX required security for the citizens and vessels of each
party against men-of-war and privateers-a usage that connotes
physical security.
Finally, although Article X of the treaty did not use the words
protection or security, a defender of the treaty, Alexander Hamilton,
contemporaneously described it as reflecting a customary duty of
protection and security. The provision in question provides that
"[nIeither the debts due from individuals of the one nation to
individuals of the other, nor shares, nor monies, which they may have
in the public funds, or in the public or private banks, shall ever in any
event of war or national differences be sequestered or confiscated."' 10
After the text of this treaty became public, some people criticized
Article X-and other provisions-as being too generous to the
British.11 1 Hamilton came to the defense of the treaty in a series of
letters published under the pseudonym "Camillus.' 1 2 Hamilton
explained that Article X was of a nature commonly found in treaties

107.
See Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Nov. 19,
1794, 8 Stat. 116, 117.
108.
Id. art. II, at 117 (emphasis added).
109.
Id. art. XIV, at 124 (emphasis added).
110.
Id. art. X, at 122.
111.
See Harold C. Syrett, Introductory Note to 18 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON 475, 475 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1973).
112.
Id.
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and asserted that those provisions clearly amounted to the following,
"that upon the breaking out of a War between the contracting parties
in each case, there shall be for a term of six or nine months full
protection and security to the persons and property of the subjects of
one which are then in the territories of the other."'113 He added that
the granting of such protection to alien merchants and their property
formed "a part of the law of Nations."114 Hence, he argued, by
including Article X the parties had done nothing extraordinary; they
had simply incorporated a preexisting obligation under the law of
nations. Significantly, Hamilton cited Vattel in support of the
existence of such a customary norm of protection and security."15
In another letter, Hamilton elaborated upon this norm as
follows:
The right of holding or having property in a country always implies a
duty on the part of its Government to protect that property and to
secure to the owner the full enjoyment of it. Whenever therefore a
Government grants permission to foreigners to acquire property within
its territories or to bring & deposit it there, it tacitly promises
16
protectionand security.1

Hamilton added that this duty required that "the foreign
proprietor ...shall enjoy the rights privileges and immunities of a
native proprietor-without any other exceptions than those which the
established laws may have previously declared." 117 In other words,
the customary duty of protection and security required equal
protection before the law, among other things.
The foregoing evidence makes it clear that the notion of
protection and security in the earliest U.S. commercial treaties
contemplated shelter from a range of threats, from attacks by men-ofwar to governmental confiscations to infringements of legal rights. It
also suggests that these treaties used the phrase in essentially the
same manner as had Wolff and Vattel.
B. From 1800 Through World War I
During the nineteenth century and the first part of the
twentieth, the customary notion of protection and security underwent

ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE DEFENCE No. XXII (Oct. 14, 1795), reprinted
113.
in 19 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 380, 382 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1973)
(emphasis added).
Id. at 387.
114.
115.

ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE DEFENCE No. XXI (Oct. 30, 1795), reprinted in

19 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 365, 365 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1973).
116.
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE DEFENCE No. XIX (Oct. 14, 1795), reprinted in
19 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 318, 319 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1973)
(emphasis added).
117.
Id.
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further refinement, and U.S. FCN treaties evolved in commensurate
fashion. The evidence is unequivocal, however, that the standard was
understood throughout this period as requiring more than mere police
protection. Indeed, to the extent the standard evolved, it was in the
direction of requiring more extensive protections under the law for
aliens' property rights.
1.

Developments in Customary International Law

Several commentators asserted during this period that the
customary duty of protection requires not only physical protection but
also ready access to courts, equal protection before the law, and just
treatment by governmental authorities.
For example, in his 1878 Commentary on International Law,
James Kent observed: "When foreigners are admitted into a state
upon free and liberal terms, the public faith becomes pledged for their
protection. The courts of justice ought to be freely open to them to
resort to for the redress of their grievances. ' 118 Similarly, Lassa
Oppenheim commented in 1905 as follows:
[A] foreigner ...must be afforded such protection of his person and
property as is enjoyed by a citizen.... In consequence thereof every

State is by the Law of Nations compelled to grant to foreigners equality
before the law with its citizens as far as safety of person and property is
concerned. A foreigner must in especial not be wronged in person or
property by the officials and Courts of a State. Thus, the police must
not arrest him without just cause, custom-house officials must treat him
civilly, Courts of Justice must treat him justly and in accordance with
119
the law.

Scholars and diplomats from capital-exporting countries also
began emphasizing during this era that the protection offered to
foreigners must be consistent with internationalstandards, not only
national ones. They did so in response to a position first articulated
by the Argentine diplomat Carlos Calvo-and later taken up many
Latin American countries-that a home state has no basis to
complain under international law unless the treatment accorded to
its nationals is worse than that experienced by host-state
nationals. 120 An example of the developed country view that host
118.

JAMES KENT, KENT'S COMMENTARY ON INTERNATIONAL LAw 113 (J.T. Abdy

ed., 2d ed. 1878) (emphasis added).
119.

L. OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 376 (1st ed. 1905) (emphasis added).

120.

[P]ostcolonial Latin American jurists drew upon the teachings of Carlos

Calvo, an Argentine diplomat of the late nineteenth century, to reject
the developed nations' arguments for an 'international minimum
standard' of treatment for aliens. Instead, their position was that
aliens were entitled only to the same level of treatment that domestic
nationals receive under the domestic laws and legal system.
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states must meet an international minimum in the protection
accorded to foreigners can be seen in the following comments by
former U.S. Secretary of State Elihu Root in 1910:
Each country is bound to give to the nationals of another country in its
territory the benefit of the same laws, the same administration, the
same protection, and the same redress for injury which it gives to its
own citizens, and neither more nor less: provided the protection which
the country gives to its own citizens conforms to the established
12 1
standard of civilization.

In time, this notion that the host state must meet "the established
standard of civilization" in relation to foreigners would come122to be
known as the "international minimum standard of treatment."
2.

Protection and Security Clauses in Treaty Practice

Protection and security provisions in U.S. FCN treaties from this
era likewise reflect a requirement that the host state's legal system
include certain basic features. For example, an 1824 FCN Treaty with
Colombia provided that each party was "to give their special
protection to the persons and property of the citizens of each
other.., leaving open and free to them the tribunals of justice for
their judicial recourse. '123 In other words, the legal system must
provide covered foreigners with open access to the courts. Moreover, a
U.S. diplomatic instruction from 1866 asserted that this provision in
the treaty would preclude "any arbitraryact of either Government
whereby a citizen of the other may be deprived of his rights or injured
in his property without due process of law.'1 2 4 This suggests that the
notion of protection and security required not only access to courts

Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment
Treaties: Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 48, 52
(2008)
121.
Elihu Root, The Basis of Protection to Citizens Residing Abroad, 4 AM. J.
INT'L L. 517, 521 (1910) (emphasis added).
See SALACUSE, supra note 86, at 48 (describing Root's comments as "[aln
122.
authoritative statement of the international minimum standard"); see also ANDREAS H.
ROTH, THE INTERNATIONAL MINIMUM STANDARD 112-13 (1949) (describing the
international minimum standard and its rationale).
123.
General Convention of Peace, Amity, Navigation and Commerce, U.S.Colom., Oct. 3, 1824, art. 10, 8 Stat. 306.
124.
Robert R. Wilson, Property-Protection Provisions in United States
Commercial Treaties, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 83, 97 (1951) (emphasis added) (quoting a U.S.
diplomatic instruction of April 9, 1886). By the time of this instruction, Colombia had
changed its name to New Granada, and the 1824 treaty had been superseded by a new
treaty concluded in 1846. Treaty of Peace, Amity, Navigation and Commerce, U.S.-New
Granada, Dec. 12, 1846, 6 Bevans 868. Nevertheless, the "protection" clause to which
the instruction referred was worded almost identically to the 1824 original. See id. art.
XIII.
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but also that those courts refrain from arbitrary applications of the
law and provide due process.
The relevant provisions of the U.S. FCN treaties concluded
during the nineteenth century with Costa Rica, Argentina, and Japan
had nearly identical language, except that they referred to "the most
complete protection and security" or to "full and perfect protection,"
rather than to "special protection.' 1 25 One distinctive feature of the
treaty with Japan, however, was that it added that one party's
nationals "shall enjoy in the territories of the other the same
protection as native citizens or subjects in regard to patents, trademarks and designs, upon fulfilment of the formalities prescribed by
law."'126 This is yet another usage of the term protection that
contemplates nonphysical protection, as it relates to intangible
property.
All of this contrasts with the position taken by some modern
tribunals-and embraced in the most recent U.S. investment
treaties-that the notion of protection and security under customary
international law is limited to police protection.
Other countries began including protection and security clauses
in their commercial treaties during this period as well. For example,
an 1861 treaty between Italy and Venezuela provided that "[t]he
citizens and subjects of one state shall enjoy in the territory of the
other the fullest measure of protection and security of person and
property."'127 After that treaty was concluded, an Italian national,
Salvatore Sambiaggio, experienced "requisitions and forced loans
exacted of him by revolutionary troops" during a time of civil war in
Venezuela. 128 Italy brought a claim on behalf of Sambiaggio before a
claims commission, asserting that Venezuela had violated the treaty's
protection and security provision by failing to protect Sambiaggio
from those losses. 129 The umpire in the case, Jackson H. Ralston,
determined that the protection and security clause contemplated a
duty of due diligence on the part of one party to protect nationals of

125.
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Japan, art. I, Nov. 22, 1894, 1
U.S.T. 352 [hereinafter U.S-Japan FCN Treaty]; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation, U.S.-Arg., arts. II, VIII, July 27, 1853, 5 Bevans 61; Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Costa Rica, arts. II, VII, July 10, 1851, 6 Bevans 1013.
126.
U.S.-Japan FCN Treaty, supranote 125, art. XVI (emphasis added).
127.
See Salvatore Sambiaggio (It. v. Venez.), 10 R.I.A.A. 499, 518 (It.-Venez.
Mixed Claims Comm'n 1903) (emphasis added) (quoting Article 4 of the treaty).
128.
Id. at 500.
See id. at 500-02 (recording Italy's assertion that Venezuela had a duty to
129.
guard against such losses when "said authorities exercise a de facto power or when the
troops have a recognized military organization for the purpose of overthrowing the
legal government").
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the other party. 130 He nevertheless rejected the claim on various
grounds, including his conclusion that Venezuela did not control the
revolutionaries and could not reasonably have prevented the
131
losses.
As will be seen, this case-and Ralston's use of a "due diligence"
test in particular-would prove influential to subsequent tribunals
and scholars seeking to identify the degree of protection required by
the standard.
C. Between the World Wars
World War I and its aftermath brought an increase in hostility
toward foreigners in many countries, 132 as well as regime changes
and associated expropriations of foreign-owned private property in
Russia and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. 133 Faced with these
developments, the United States adjusted the wording of its
protection and security clauses so as to spell out in more detail the
characteristics of the host state's legal system that were
contemplated by the standard. Meanwhile, international tribunals
reaffirmed traditional notions of protection and security, and the
League of Nations attempted (unsuccessfully) to codify the concept.
1.

Adjustments to U.S. Protection and Security Clauses

Following World War I, the protection and security provisions in
newly concluded U.S. FCN treaties underwent a marked change.
They began to articulate various civil liberties to be enjoyed by
covered nationals, and made explicit both the fact that the standard
was enshrined in general international law and the fact that covered
foreigners were entitled to compensation for any expropriations. In no
instance did any treaty indicate that the standard was somehow
limited to police protection.
The FCN treaty that the United States concluded with Germany
in 1923 is illustrative. Article I began by reciting various civil

130.
See id. at 524 (stating that if it is "alleged and proved that Venezuelan
authorities failed to exercise due diligence to prevent damages from being inflicted by
revolutionists, that country should be held responsible").
131.
See id. (holding that "[i]n the present instance no such want of diligence is
alleged and proved").
132.
See Pitman B. Potter, International Legislation on the Treatment of
Foreigners,AM. J. INT'L L. 748, 749 (1930) (noting that during the War, "the equal and
equitable treatment of the alien began to be abandoned, or deliberately reversed, in
favor of discriminatory treatment of one sort or another, in a great many European
States").
133.
VANDEVELDE, supra note 5, at 34-35.
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liberties to be accorded to covered nationals, including access to
courts of justice, then provided:
The nationals of each High Contracting Party shall receive within
the territories of the other, upon submitting to conditions imposed upon
its nationals, the most constant protection and security for their persons
and property, and shall enjoy in this respect that degree of protection
that is required by internationallaw. Their property shall not be taken
without due process of law and without payment of just
134
compensation.

That U.S. officials viewed the standard as extending beyond
police protection is further demonstrated by a December 31, 1924,
Memorandum by the office of the State Department's Solicitor
regarding this treaty with Germany. 135 That Memorandum observed
the following:
In the last paragraph of Article I it is provided that the treatment
accorded the resident alien is that accorded by international law. This
stipulation will operate to secure protection againstarbitraryand unjust
treatmentin any particular in which the Government of a country does
not accord its own nationals as liberal treatment as that which is
136
recognized in international law.

In other words, Article I's mandate to accord protection and security
as "required by international law" contemplated not merely physical
protection, but protection against arbitrary and unjust treatment as
well.
2.

Jurisprudence and Diplomatic Correspondence

While U.S. protection and security provisions were being
modified and interpreted in this manner, other sources of
international law were regularly alluding to a duty to give protection
and security to foreigners, and making clear that it required certain
legal as well as physical safeguards.
Several decisions involving this duty were rendered by the U.S.Mexico General Claims Commission, a body established pursuant to
an agreement between the United States and Mexico dated
September 8, 1923.137 In such cases, the Commission repeatedly

134.
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Consular Rights, U.S.-Ger., art. I,
Dec. 8, 1923, 8 Bevans 153 (emphasis added).
135.
Memorandum, Office of the Solicitor, Dep't of State, Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Consular Rights Between the United States and Germany Concluded
December 8, 1923: Legal Reasons Why Such a Treaty is Desirable, file 711.622/60 (Dec.
31, 1924) (on file with author) [hereinafter Solicitor Memorandum].
136.
Id. (emphasis added).
137.
See Convention Between the United States and Mexico for the Reciprocal
Settlement of Claims, U.S.-Mex., Sept. 8, 1923, 43 Stat. 1730 (describing the
composition and establishment of the Commission).

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL.451.l095

asserted that a state has a duty under international law to protect
foreigners within its territory according to a standard of reasonable
care or due diligence, and sometimes found the respondent liable for
138
failure to satisfy the standard.
Although the cases before that Commission generally involved
physical harms, other authorities at the time were recognizing that
the duty of protection and security contemplates more than police
protection.
For example, in the Brown case of 1923,139 another claims
commission held that a Boer-dominated political entity known as the
Transvaal Republic violated international law by rendering
"manifestly insecure" a U.S. citizen's interest in certain mining
claims. 140 The commission labeled the international delict in question
a "denial of justice" and explained that it resulted from the combined
actions of the executive, legislature, and judiciary, which reflected a
legal system incapable of securing the U.S. citizen's property
rights. 141 This is similar to Jan Paulsson's observation that denial of
justice in customary international law is a systemic failure, namely "a
1 42
failure of a national legal system to provide due process."'
Also during this period, U.S. State Department officials asserted
to Spanish authorities that the customary duty of protection required
compensation in the event of expropriation. Specifically, in
correspondence sent during the Spanish Civil War of the 1930s, U.S.
officials referred to recent confiscations of property owned by U.S.
nationals and asserted that the "protection to which it is entitled
under international law" required "prompt and full compensation to
'143
the owners.
Such references to a duty under international law to protect or
secure foreigners' property rights provide further evidence that the
customary norm of protection and security was seen at the time as
extending beyond police protection.

138.
See, e.g., Youmans (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R.I.A.A. 110, 114-15 (U.S.-Mex. Gen.
Claims Comm'n 1926) (upholding a claim that was predicated on "the failure of the
Mexican Government to exercise due diligence to protect the father of the claimant
from the fury of the mob at whose hands he was killed, and the failure to take proper
steps looking to the apprehension and punishment of the persons implicated in the
crime"); Home Ins. Co. (U.S. v. Mex.), 6 R.I.A.A. 48, 52 (U.S.-Mex. Gen. Claims Comm'n
1926) (holding that Mexico was not liable because it discharged its "duty to protect the
persons and property within its jurisdiction by such means as were reasonably
necessary to accomplish that end").
139.
Brown (U.S. v. Gr. Brit.), 6 R.I.A.A. 120, 120 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1923).
140.
Id. at 129 (emphasis added).
141.
See id. at 128-29 ("All three branches of the Government conspired to ruin
his

enterprise ....

[A]

system

was

created

under

which

all

property

became... manifestly insecure.").
142.

JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 36 (2005).

143.

Dep't of State, file 352.115/45 (on file with author) (emphasis added).

rights
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Attempts to Codify the Customary Duty

The Covenant by which the League of Nations was established in
1919 included a provision, Article 23(e), which committed each
member state to "make provision to secure and maintain freedom of
communications and of transit and equitable treatment for the
commerce of all Members of the League. '144 This appears to be the
first time that an international instrument used the term equitable
treatment in relation to foreign investment-a practice that has since
become common with the profusion of fair and equitable treatment
clauses in investment treaties.
The Covenant seems to have used the term equitable treatment
as shorthand for the treatment to which foreigners are entitled under
customary international law. It cannot have been a coincidence that
the drafters of Article 23(e) chose the term treatment, which by then
was being used routinely (together with protection and security) to
refer to a host state's international obligations toward foreigners.
Such usage can be seen, for example, in Root's comments that the
customary duty of protection contemplates an international minimum
standard of treatment. 145 It can also be seen in the assertion by the
U.S.-Mexico General Claims Commission that, under international
law, aliens must be "treatedin accordance with ordinary standards of
1 46
civilization."'
Indeed, that the drafters of Article 23(e) understood a
requirement of equitable treatment as existing under customary
international law is evident from the fact that, shortly after the
Covenant's adoption, the League of Nations' Economic Committee
initiated efforts to codify states' customary obligations toward
foreigners "in pursuance of' this provision. 14 7 This is not to say that

144.
League of Nations Covenant art. 23(e), reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL
LEGISLATION 16 (Manley 0. Hudson ed., 1931) (emphasis added).
145.
See Root, supra note 121, at 521-22 (discussing the customary duty of
protection and asserting that "[i]f any country's system of law and administration does
not conform to that standard, although the people of the country may be content or
compelled to live under it, no other country can be compelled to accept it as furnishing
a satisfactory measure of treatmentto its citizens" (emphasis added)).
146.
Roberts (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R.I.A.A. 77, 80 (U.S.-Mex. Gen. Claims Comm'n
1926).
147.

The League of Nations Covenant pledges the members to "make
provision to secure and maintain.., equitable treatment for the
commerce of all members." It was in pursuance of this intention that
the Economic Committee of the League drew up the Draft Convention
on the Treatment of Foreigners, which deals in particular with
commercial matters and allied fields.

John Ward Cutler, The Treatment of Foreigners in Relation to the Trade Convention
and Conference of 1929, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 225, 233 (1933) (emphasis added). Another
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the drafters of the Covenant believed that international law in this
area was perfectly settled and faithfully followed by all countries.
Had that been the case, there would have been no need to require
such treatment in the Covenant and no benefit to codifying
international law on the subject. Nevertheless, in light of the
foregoing, it cannot be credibly doubted that they understood
international law as addressing the treatment due to an alien, and as
148
requiring, in a general sense, that it be equitable.
The drafters of Article 23(e) could just as well have referred to an
obligation to accord protection or security to foreigners. The notions of
equitable treatment, on the one hand, and protection or security, on
the other, were viewed by many at the time as equivalent, or at least
overlapping. This is evident from the Solicitor's assertion in 1924 that
the treaty obligation of protection and security precluded "arbitrary
and unjust treatment" of U.S. citizens. 149 It is also clear from the fact
that the draft convention prepared pursuant to Article 23(e) began as
a "series of principles for the guidance of states in respect to the
protection of foreign nationals and enterprises against arbitrary fiscal
treatment and unfair discrimination."'150 In fact, although the draft
convention itself was entitled a "Draft Convention on the Treatment
of Foreigners," a commentator described it at the time as "in part a
codification of international law relating to the protection of
aliens.' 151 And, indeed, the Draft Convention referred repeatedly to
152
an obligation of "protection."'

scholar described this draft convention at the time as an attempt at "codification of
international law relating to the protection of aliens." Arthur K. Kuhn, International
Conference on the Treatment of Foreigners,24 AM. J. INT'L L. 570, 573 (1930) (emphasis
added).
148.
A student note has argued that the term "equitable treatment" in Article
23(e) could not have been referring to a notion within customary international law
because the law in that area was not fully settled at the time. See Theodore Kill, Note,
Don't Cross the Streams: Past and Present Overstatement of Customary International
Law in Connection with Conventional Fairand Equitable Treatment Obligations, 106
MICH. L. REV. 853, 870 (2008). This argument assumes that the parties to an
international agreement could not (or would not) refer to a principle of law unless its
meaning was settled. The reality is that parties do precisely that all the time. A good
example is the multitude of modern investment treaties in which the parties agree to
accord "fair and equitable treatment," "protection and security," and treatment no less
than that required by "international law," notwithstanding ongoing controversies over
the precise meanings of those terms and the contours of international law generally.
See VANDEVELDE, supra note 5, at 226-32 (discussing these notions and controversies
surrounding their meanings).
149.
Solicitor Memorandum, supra note 135 (emphasis added).
150.
Kuhn, supra note 147, at 571 (emphasis added).
151.
Id. at 573 (emphasis added).
152.
Draft Convention on the Treatment of Foreigners,League of Nations Doc.
C.36.M.21.II, passim (1929).
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For example, Article 9 provided that "[n]ationals of each of the
High Contracting Parties shall enjoy in the territory of the other High
Contracting Parties the same treatment as nationals in respect of the
legal and judicial protection of their persons, property, rights and
interests. ' 15 3 This article went on to list specific legal protections to be
file lawsuits and to have the law
accorded, including the right to
1 54
applied without discrimination.
Similarly, Article 12 provided that covered nationals shall enjoy,
with regard to fiscal charges, "the same treatment and the same
protection by the fiscal authorities and tribunals as nationals of the
country."'1 5 Once again, the term protection is used in tandem with
treatment and connotes shelter from nonphysical threats.
Around the same time, researchers from Harvard Law School
prepared their own draft codification of states' obligations toward
foreigners. Completed in 1929 and entitled Draft Convention on
Responsibility of States for Damage Done in Their Territory to the
Person or Property of Foreigners, this instrument, too, set forth a
number of principles associated with the customary norm of
protection and security. 156 For example, Article 5 provided that "[a]
state has a duty to afford to an alien means of redress for injuries
which are not less adequate than the means of redress afforded to its
nationals.' 157 In addition, Article 9 dealt with "denials of justice,"
providing that states are responsible for injury resulting from "denial,
unwarranted delay or obstruction of access to courts, gross deficiency
in the administration of judicial or remedial process, failure to
considered
generally
guaranties which are
provide those
indispensable to the proper administration of justice, or a manifestly
unjust judgment.' 158 These provisions call to mind assertions by such
authorities as Wolff, Vattel, and Kent that the customary duty of
protection and security requires remedial mechanisms for injuries
incurred by a foreigner. They also evoke the guarantees of due
process in legal proceedings set forth in the protection and security
provisions of U.S. FCN treaties concluded during the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries.
Article 10 of this Draft Convention provided further that "[a]
state is responsible if an injury to an alien results from its failure to
exercise due diligence to prevent the injury, if local remedies have

Id. art. 9 (emphasis added).
153.
Id.
154.
155.
Id. art. 12 (emphasis added).
Edwin M. Borchard, Part II: Responsibility of States for Damage Done in
156.
Their Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners, 23 AM. J. INT'L L. 133, 133
(Spec. Supp. 1929).
Id.
157.
Id. art. 9, at 134.
158.
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been exhausted without adequate redress for such failure. ' 15 9 This
captures yet another aspect of the customary norm of protection and
security, as expressed in cases like Sambiaggio: the duty to use due
diligence to prevent injuries to aliens.
Both of these attempts at codification ultimately foundered as a
result of disagreements within the increasingly diverse international
160
community regarding the nature of the duties owed to foreigners.
Nevertheless, both give insight into how their drafters understood
international law at the time.
D. The Early Decades of the Cold War
World War II and its aftermath only increased ideological
divisions within the international community. The spread of
communism resulted in a new wave of expropriations, and hostility
toward foreign investments in developing countries became
increasingly common. 16 1
Faced with these developments, the U.S. government and
business interests in capital-exporting countries came to view
investor protections at the international level as more important than
ever. Accordingly, the United States strengthened its FCN treaty
program and participated in a series of talks aimed at concluding a
multilateral convention on investment, while business interests
worked independently to promote a similar accord. The resulting
treaties and draft instruments all contained protection and security
clauses and were the immediate precursors to those in modern
treaties. As will be seen, their language, drafting history, and
associated commentary all signal that the protection and security
standard as used therein contemplated a legal system featuring
particular substantive and procedural protections, and that the
standard was seen as expressing customary international law.

159.
Id. art. 10, at 134.
160.
See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 5, at 15-17; see also Manley 0.
Hudson, The First Conference for the Codification of InternationalLaw, 24 AM. J. INT'L
L. 447, 459 (1930) (noting that there was extensive jurisprudcnce and scholarship on
the subject of state responsibility, but that it was "not understood in the same way in
all countries," and its authority was "not universally acknowledged in the same
degree").
161.
VANDEVELDE, supra note 5, at 41-43; see also Louis Henkin, International
Law: Politics, Values and Functions,in 216 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 195-96 (1989).
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The Havana Charter and the
Commerce Code of Fair Treatment

International

Chamber

of

On March 24, 1948, in Havana, Cuba, fifty-three countries
finalized and executed a document that came to be known as the
Havana Charter. 6 2 This instrument called for the formation of an
International Trade Organization (ITO) to help negotiate and
implement international agreements on trade and investment, and
contained notable references to the need for the "equitable treatment"
1
and "security" of investments. 63
In particular, Article 11(2) called for the ITO to make
recommendations for international agreements designed "to assure
just and equitable treatment for the enterprise, skills, capital, arts
and technology brought from one Member country to another.' 6 4
Article 12 added that member states were to "provide reasonable
opportunities for investments acceptable to them and adequate
16 5
security for existing and future investments.'
The drafting history of the Havana Charter gives some insight
into how its drafters understood the term security as used in Article
12. Notably, in one session, the delegate from Czechoslovakia (which
had recently experienced a Communist revolution) proposed inserting
the word "legal" before "security. '16 6 He asserted that this edit would
be appropriate because, without it, an investor might argue that the
term "security" contemplated political security, and specifically
security against a revolution. 16 7 The U.S. delegate responded that he
had "no strong objection" to this proposal, but that it was unnecessary
because "no Member would be so unreasonable as to demand security
whilst a country was in a state of revolution.' ' 6 8 The UK delegate, in
turn, commented that he opposed the proposal because "tilt suggests
a very narrowly legalistic interpretation of security and I am sure the
intention was that it should be wider."'169 These comments reveal that
the delegates had no objection to requiring legal security, and, to the

162.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Havana, Cuba, Nov.
21, 1947-Mar. 24, 1948, Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization,
FinalAct and Related Documents, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/78 (Mar. 24, 1948) [hereinafter
Havana Charter].
163.
Hugh M. Hollman & William E. Kovacic, The International Competition
Network: Its Past, Current and Future Role, 20 MINN. J. INT'L L. 274, 316-17 (2011);
accord VANDEVELDE, supra note 5, at 41.

164.
Havana Charter,supra note 162, art. 11(2) (emphasis added).
165.
Id. art. 12(2)(a)(i) (emphasis added).
166.
See U.N. ESCOR, 2d Sess., 39th mtg. at 21, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/AIPV/39
(Aug. 14, 1947) (comments of Mr. Augenthaler).
167.
Id. (emphasis added).
168.
Id. at 24.
169.
Id. (emphasis added).
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contrary, believed that the existing reference to security already
covered legal security. The only question was whether the language
should be qualified to make clear that it did not cover political in
addition to legal and physical security.
In any event, the Havana Charter never entered into force, in
part because business interests in capital-exporting states felt that
the language concerning investment had been watered down
excessively at the insistence of developing countries. 170 Accordingly,
in 1949, the International Chamber of Commerce promulgated a draft
that employed the same basic notions of treatment and security, but
articulated them more robustly. Although it was never adopted, this
instrument-formally entitled the International Code of Fair
Treatment for Foreign Investments (the ICC Code)1 71-bears striking
similarities to modern investment treaties.
Notably, Article 2 set forth a commitment by the parties "to
apply fair treatment... to investments of any kind made in their
172
territories by the nationals of the other High Contracting Parties."'
This is quite similar to the modern fair and equitable treatment
clause.
Article 5 of the ICC Code was a form of protection and security
clause, providing that:
[Tihe treatment extended to the nationals of the other High
Contracting Parties shall be not less favourable than that applied
to their own nationals, in respect of the legal and judicialprotection
of their person, property, rights and interests, and in respect of the
acquisition, purchase, sale and assignment of moveable and
173
immoveable property of any kind.

Once again, the term protection was being used here to signify more
than police protection.
2.

The Post-World War II U.S.
Navigation Treaty Program

Friendship,

Commerce, and

While these efforts to achieve a multilateral investment accord
were playing out, the United States was busy concluding bilateral
FCN treaties. 174 These consistently included protection and security

170.
See VANDEVELDE, supra note 5, at 41; Gudrun Monika Zagel, Protection of
Foreign Investment Under International Law, in INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF
FOREIGN INVESTMENT 6 (Dennis Campbell ed., 2d ed. 2010).
Int'l Chamber of Commerce [ICC], International Code of Fair Treatment for
171.
Foreign Investments, Brochure 129 (June 1949) [hereinafter ICC Code].
Id. art. 2 (emphasis added).
172.
173.
Id. art. 5 (emphasis added).
174.
See VANDEVELDE, supra note 5, at 56 (noting that the United States
concluded twenty-one FCN treaties between 1946 and 1966).
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provisions, and their language-as well as contemporaneous
commentary by State Department officials-make it clear that they,
too, contemplated a legal system offering certain substantive and
procedural protections for covered foreigners.
Perhaps the most compelling piece of evidence in this regard is
an official State Department publication from the late 1950s
describing the FCN treaty program. 175 Among the observations in
that document were the following:
U.S. FCN treaties include "assurances of protection and security
for the individual in his capacity as property holder. These
include freedom from unlawful visit and search of his home or
place of business, the right to just compensation if his property is
taken by the state, and certain rights in connection with
acquiring, holding, and disposing of both real and personal
176
property."'
"Guaranties of security of rights in property, of course, are of
special importance to the American who goes abroad as a
businessman. Without such guaranties the economic privileges
177
given to him by a treaty would lose much of their meaning."
"Special attention has been given to affording American
investors a proper measure of security against undue risks likely
to plague their foreign operations. It has not been intended to
shield the investor against the economic risks to which venture
capital is subject but to reduce the special hazards to which
overseas investment may be exposed by reason of unfavorable
17
laws or juridicalconditions." 8
These comments provide strong evidence that the obligation of
protection and security as used in U.S. FCN treaties of this era was
designed to shield investors not only from physical threats but also
from unreasonable searches, uncompensated expropriations, and
adverse juridical conditions. They stand in sharp contrast to the
language in recent U.S. investment treaties asserting that the duty of
protection and security is limited to police protection.
That the protection and security provisions of the early Cold War
era contemplated more than police protection can also be seen from
contemporaneous commentary by the scholar Michael Brandon. He
asserted that protection and security provisions were designed to
ensure that "individual and corporate aliens are entitled to the same

175.
See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. NO. 6565, COMMERCIAL TREATY PROGRAM OF
THE UNITED STATES (1958).

176.
177.
178.

Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
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protection before the law as is enjoyed by nationals, assuming this
179
meets the minimum international standard."'
This conclusion is supported by the wording of protection and
security provisions from the period, and from their context within the
relevant treaties. Although these provisions were more elaborate in
some respects than their predecessors (in that they included, for
example, a specific formula for calculating the compensation due
upon expropriation), their wording makes clear that these new details
were mere elements of the overarching concept of protection and
security.
This point is illustrated by the U.S. FCN treaties concluded with
China in 1946180 (shortly before the Communist takeover of that
country) and Italy in 1948.181 The protection and security provisions
of those treaties began with a broad requirement that each party
provide nationals of the other with "the full protection and security
required by international law.' 82 They then specified (in the rest of
the first two paragraphs) various guarantees and benefits to be
accorded to covered nationals in that regard, including certain
elements of due process and compensation for expropriation. 8 3 The
third paragraph continued:
The nationals, corporations and associations of either High
Contracting Party shall throughout the territories of the other High
Contracting Party receive protection and security with respect to the
matters enumerated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, upon
compliance with the laws and regulations, if any, which are or may
hereafter be enforced by the duly constituted authorities .... 184

In other words, covered nationals and companies were to enjoy
protection and security with respect to due process in legal
proceedings and compensation for expropriation. This makes sense
only if protection and security extended beyond physical protection,
because the mentioned elements are legal protections, not physical.
Another notable U.S. FCN treaty is the one concluded with
Belgium in 1961.185 Article 1 of that treaty provided: "Each

179.
Michael Brandon, Legal Aspects of Private Foreign Investments, 18 FED.
B.J. 298, 323 (1958) (emphasis added).
180.
See Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-China, Nov. 11,
1946, 6 Bevans 761 [hereinafter U.S.-China FCN Treaty].
181.
See Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-It., Feb. 2, 1948,
12 U.S.T. 131 [hereinafter U.S.-Italy FCN Treaty].
182.
U.S.-China FCN Treaty, supra note 180, art. VI; U.S. -Italy FCN Treaty,
supra note 181, art. V.
183.
U.S.-China FCN Treaty, supra note 180, art. VI; U.S. -Italy FCN Treaty,
supra note 181, art. V.
184.
U.S.-China FCN Treaty, supra note 180, art. VI (emphasis added); accord
U.S-Italy FCN Treaty, supra note 181, art. V.
185.
Treaty of Friendship, Establishment, and Navigation, U.S.-Belg., Feb. 21,
1961, 14.2 U.S.T. 1284 [hereinafter U.S.-Belgium FCN Treaty] (emphasis added).
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Contracting Party shall at all times accord equitable treatment and
effective protection to the persons, property, enterprises, rights and
interests of nationals and companies of the other Party." 186 Article 3.1
added: "Nationals of either Contracting Party within the territories of
the other Party shall be accorded full legal and judicial protection for
their persons, rights and interests. Such nationals shall be free from
molestation and shall receive constant protection in no case less than
that required by international law. ' 18 7 Finally, Article 4.1 added:
"Property that nationals and companies of either Contracting Party
own within the territories of the other Party shall enjoy constant
1 88
This
security therein through full legal and judicial protection."
represents the most extreme recognition within the corpus of U.S.
FCN treaties that the duty of protection and security contemplated
more than police protection.
It might be possible to dismiss this treaty as one whose
conception of protection and security was materially different from
the norm, except that when it was presented for Senate approval, the
State Department offered its assurances that the treaty did not
materially differ from other U.S. FCN treaties. Specifically, a State
Department official testified that although"[c]onsiderable recasting of
the normal wording used in U.S. treaties was found necessary" to
overcome concerns raised by negotiating counterparties, these
modifications were "of relatively minor significance. ' 18 9 Far from
being anomalous, in fact, this treaty tracked closely the wording of
earlier draft multilateral instruments, including the 1929 Draft
Convention on the Treatment of Foreigners and the 1949 ICC Code
(discussed in Parts III.C.3 and III.D.1, above, respectively). All of this
suggests that the insertion of the words legal and judicial before
protection and security simply made explicit a detail that otherwise
would have been implicit.
The FCN treaties concluded by the United States during this
period also witnessed the arrival of certain provisions that would
later be fixtures of modern U.S. investment treaties, albeit in
modified form. These included, inter alia, clauses prohibiting
unreasonable and discriminatory impairment of acquired rights1 90
treatment.191
and
equitable
requiring
fair
and
clauses
Contemporaneous commentary on these provisions indicates that

186.
Id. art. 1 (emphasis added).
187.
Id. art. 3.1 (emphasis added).
188.
Id. art. 4.1 (emphasis added).
189.
S. EXEC. Doc. No. 87-89 (1961) (statement of Peyton Kerr, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Dep't of State).
See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Greece, art.
190.
VIII, Aug. 3, 1951, 5.2 U.S.T. 1829.
191.
See, e.g., id. art. XIV(4).
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both were viewed as related to protection and security, and as
192
expressing aspects of customary international law.
As for the new "unreasonable and discriminatory impairment"
provisions, Herman Walker Jr., a U.S. State Department treaty
negotiator, 193 explained that they were designed to "reaffirm[] and
reinforce[ I] traditional international law regarding the protection
which a government owes to the property of the alien," and to target
in particular improper governmental conduct falling short of outright
expropriation. 1 94 In other words, these new provisions were merely
articulating a facet of the preexisting customary duty of protection.
Walker added that U.S. negotiators decided it was prudent to begin
spelling out this (and other) aspects of the customary duty of
protection, in light of the unsettled state of international law and the
increasing frequency with which governments were interfering with
private property in ways short of expropriation. 195
With regard to the new fair and equitable treatment clauses,
these bear obvious similarity to the references to "just and equitable
treatment" in the Havana Charter (adopted in 1948) and "fair
treatment" in the ICC Code (promulgated in 1949).196 Moreover, as
already seen, those two instruments were themselves inspired by
earlier references to equitable treatment in the League of Nations
Covenant of 1923 and the Draft Convention on the Treatment of
Foreigners of 1929, and those draft instruments sought to express
customary international law.
Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that when fair and
equitable treatment clauses began appearing in U.S. FCN treaties,
several scholars noted that the standard was derived from customary
international law. Brandon, for one, asserted that these clauses were
intended to express an obligation of "good faith" under customary

192.
See, e.g., Herman Walker, Jr., The Post-War Commercial Treaty Programof
the United States, 73 POL. SC'. Q. 57, 69 (1958).
193.
See Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 182 n.6 (1982)
(explaining that Walker "served as Adviser on Commercial Treaties at the State
Department" during the 1950s, and "was responsible for formulation of the postwar
form of the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty and negotiated several of the
treaties for the United States").
194.
Walker, supranote 192, at 69 (emphasis added).
195.
Herman Walker, Jr., Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of
Foreign Investment: United States Practice,5 AM. J. COMP. L. 229, 235-36 (1956); see
also Walker, supra note 192 (discussing how the treaties provide for property
protection).
196.
See VANDEVELDE, supra note 5, at 195-97 (asserting that the fair and
equitable treatment provisions that first appeared in U.S. FCN treaties were inspired
by the Havana Charter and a draft agreement negotiated by the Organization of
American States the same year, which contained a similar reference to "just and
equitable treatment").
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international law. 197 Similarly, Georg Schwarzenberger wrote that
the standard obliges host states to treat foreigners "in accordance
with the requirements of jus aequum,"198 which he defined as a "legal
system in which rights are relative and must be exercised reasonably
and in good faith."'199 F.A. Mann expressed a similar understanding
in his treatise on The Legal Aspect of Money, asserting that
customary international law prohibits "unjustifiable discrimination,
deliberate injury, arbitrariness, [and] denial of justice lato sensu or
abuse of rights" under the notion of "fair and equitable treatment or,
as it is sometimes put, good faith that every State is internationally
required to display in its conduct towards aliens." 20 0 Comments such
as these by Brandon, Schwarzenberger, and Mann call to mind
earlier descriptions of an aspect of the customary norm of
protection-namely, the obligation to refrain from unjust or arbitrary
201
applications of the law.
This overlap between protection and security and fair and
equitable treatment can be explained by their common derivation
from the same customary norm. It would appear, however, that the
two standards were employed in distinct ways in post-World War II
U.S. FCN treaties. Based on the foregoing evidence, protection and
security seems to have required the host state to act with due
diligence, as reasonably necessary to protect foreigners' persons and
property, as well as to possess and make available an adequate legal
system, featuring such protections as appropriate remedial
mechanisms, due process, and a right to compensation for
expropriation. By contrast, fair and equitable treatment seems to
have concerned the manner in which states were to treat covered
nationals when interacting with them, obliging them to behave
reasonably and in good faith.

197.

Brandon, supra note 179, at 336.

198.

GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER,

FOREIGN INVESTMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL

LAW 114 (George W. Keeton & Georg Schwarzenberger eds., 1969).
199.

GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER,

THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW 3

(1976). See also Schwarzenberger's detailed discussion of the customary norm of
"equity"-of which, he argued, "good faith" was the central component. Id. at 56-76.
200.
F.A. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY 472 (5th ed. 1992). These
comments by Mann about fair and equitable treatment may seem surprising given that
he also argued in a separate article in 1983 that a fair and equitable treatment clause
in a particular UK BIT should be seen as expressing an autonomous standard, rather
than a principle of customary international law. See F.A. Mann, British Treatiesfor the
Promotion and Protection ofInvestments, 1981 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 241, reprintedin F.A.
MANN, FURTHER STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 234, 237-38 (1990). For a discussion

of the tension between Mann's various comments on the standard, see J.C. Thomas,
Reflections on Article 1105 of NAFTA: History, State Practice and the Influence of
Commentators, 17 ICSID REV.-FOR. INVEST. L.J. 21, 51-58 (2002).
201.
See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 124, at 97 (quoting an 1866 U.S. diplomatic
instruction); Solicitor Memorandum, supra note 135.
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The Abs-Shawcross and Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development Draft Conventions

Further attempts to achieve a multilateral investment accord
occurred near the end of the FCN treaty era, and the draft
instruments in which they resulted reflect the same basic
understanding of the notions of protection and security and fair and
equitable treatment.
One such effort was initiated by Hermann J. Abs, a prominent
German banker, and Lord Hartley Shawcross, a British lawyer and
politician, who in 1959 published a Draft Convention on Investments
Abroad (the Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention). 20 2 Article I of their
draft provided:
Each Party shall at all times ensure fair and equitable treatment to
the property of the nationals of the other Parties. Such property shall
be accorded the most constant protection and security within the
territories of the other Parties and the management, use, and
enjoyment thereof shall not in any way be impaired by unreasonable or
203
discriminatory measures.

The authors' commentary gives some insight into how they
understood this provision. It explains that the Draft Convention was
intended to express "fundamental principles of international law
regarding the treatment of the property, rights, and interests of
aliens," which had "a broad basis in the practice of civilized states
and the findings of international tribunals," even if "during the last
few decades in some countries there has been a tendency to disregard
them. '20 4 The authors added that the instrument was intended to
assure investors a "measure of security and protection of their
property, rights, and interests."20 5 This seems to indicate that the
protection and security standard in Article I extended beyond
physical security, because rights and interests are intangible and
therefore, any protection accorded to them is necessarily nonphysical
in nature. In addition, the authors acknowledged that Article I was
20 6
based on similar language in U.S. FCN treaties.
The international community never adopted the Abs-Shawcross
Draft Convention, but it inspired yet another attempt to achieve a
multilateral accord. Specifically, from 1962 to 1967, the Organisation

202.
See VANDEVELDE, supra note 5, at 54.
203.
The text of the Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention, together with an
introduction by the authors and their formal commentary on the draft, were published
in a special issue of the Journalof Public Law in 1960. See Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern,
The Proposed Convention to Protect Private Foreign Investment: A Round Table, 9 J.
PUB. L. 115, 116 (1960) (emphasis added).
204.
Id. at 119 (emphasis added).
205.
Id. (emphasis added).
206.
Id.

20121

RECOVERING "PROTECTIONAND SECURITY1

1139

for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (and its
European predecessor) prepared drafts of a Convention on the
Protection of Foreign Property7 (the OECD Draft Convention), based
20
on the Abs-Shawcross Draft.
Article 1(a) of the OECD Draft Convention was taken almost
verbatim from Article I of the Abs-Shawcross Draft. 20 8 Comment 1 to
the OECD Draft explained that each of the three standards
mentioned in Article 1(a) (i.e., fair and equitable treatment,
protection and security, and the prohibition on unreasonable or
discriminatory impairment) collectively expressed a "well-established
general principle of international law that a State is bound to respect
20 9
In other
and protect the property of nationals of other States."
words, the drafters viewed these notions as expressing a customary
duty to "protect" property, also known as the international minimum
210
standard.
Comment 4 elaborated upon this point as follows:
The phrase "fair and equitable treatment", customary in relevant
bilateral agreements, indicates the standard set by international law
for the treatment due by each State with regard to the property of
foreign nationals. The standard requires that.. . protection afforded
under the Convention shall be that generally accorded by the Party
concerned to its own nationals, but, being set by international law, the
standard may be more exacting where rules of national law or national
administrative practices fall short of the requirements of international
law. The standard required conforms in effect to the "minimum
211
standard"which forms part of customary internationallaw.

Comment 5 added that the phrase "[m]ost constant protection
and security" in Article 1(a) was "[c]ouched in language traditionally
used in the United States Bilateral Treaties," and "indicates the
by
obligation of each Party to exercise due diligence as regards actions
2 12
public authoritiesas well as others in relation to such property."
Comments 4 and 5 are revealing in several respects. Not only
does Comment 4 reiterate the connection between fair and equitable
treatment and the international minimum standard, but it also

OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, 7 I.L.M. 117
207.
(1968) [hereinafter OECD Draft Convention]; see also Thomas, supra note 200, at 46
(discussing how the Abs-Shawcross Draft was considered by the OECD during
drafting). See generally Council of the Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev., Draft
Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, 7 I.L.M. 117 (1968) [hereinafter
OECD Draft Convention].
Compare OECD Draft Convention, supra note 207, art. l(a), with Seidl208.
Hohenveldern, supra note 203, at 116.
209.
OECD Draft Convention, supra note 207, cmt. 1 (emphasis added).
See VANDEVELDE, supra note 5, at 199 (equating the obligation to which
210.
Comment 1 was referring with the international minimum standard).
OECD Draft Convention, supranote 207, cmt. 4(a) (emphasis added).
211.
Id. cmt. 5 (emphasis added).
212.
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suggests an overlap with protection and security in asserting that fair
and equitable treatment requires that the host state meet
international standards with regard to the protection accorded to
foreigners. In addition, Comment 5's contention that "protection and
security" refers to an obligation "to exercise due diligence as regards
actions by public authorities as well as others in relation to such
property" calls to mind references to a due diligence standard in cases
such as Sambiaggio.213 Yet it is notable that this aspect of the
Commentary is worded broadly, describing an obligation to exercise
due diligence vis-A-vis foreign property generally, not merely in
relation to physical threats.
Similarly broad conceptions of a due diligence obligation can be
found in other sources from the post-World War II era. For example,
Andreas Roth asserted that a host state has an obligation under
customary international law to use due diligence in applying its laws
to foreigners:
The alien has no protest to make if [the host state's] laws are
applied bona fide and with due diligence. But, since no
governmental organization of any sort is perfect, there is a great
possibility that he may be violated in his rights by officials in the
214
exercise of their duties.

Roth added that this obligation would be fulfilled if the state's action
vis-A-vis the foreigner "was taken in conformity with the due course of
law as ordinarily administered in the legal system under which it was
instituted. 2 15 This reinforces the conclusion that the obligation of
due diligence, as conceived by Roth, required a degree of legal
protection, rather than only physical. Indeed, Roth explicitly asserted
that if states allow foreigners to acquire property in their territory,
they "fall into an international obligation to provide the same or as
effective legal protection for it as is required for those rights which
are guaranteed by the law of nations. 2 16 The OECD Draft
Convention and its Commentary seem to have employed the notions
of protection and security and due diligence in a manner similar to
Roth.
In any event, the OECD members ultimately failed to adopt this
draft instrument, as with those that came before it. Once again it
proved too difficult to achieve consensus in a multilateral context

213.
214.
215.
216.

Id.; see, e.g., Sambiaggio, supra note 127, at 524.
ROTH, supra note 122, at 139 (emphasis added).
Id. at 141-42 (emphasis added).
Id. at 165-66 (emphasis added).
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regarding the treatment and protection to be promised to foreign
21 7
investors.
E. Protectionand Security in Modern U.S. Investment Treaties
The United States signed its last FCN treaties in 1966, with
Thailand and Togo. 218 After that, the U.S. commercial treaty program
went dormant for several years until it was finally revived in 1977,
when the Carter Administration decided to pursue a different type of
219
treaty: the BIT.
BITs are distinct from their FCN predecessors in several
respects. First, whereas FCN treaties typically concern a range of
issues-including trade and navigation, as well as investment-BITs
address only investment. 220 Second, to the extent FCN treaties
address investment, they are concerned with the protection of the
persons, rights, and interests of the covered nationals and companies
engaged in investment. By contrast, BITs protect investments per
se,2 21 as well as the nationals and companies making those
investments. 222 Third, BITs usually establish a mechanism pursuant
to which covered investors may bring arbitration claims directly
against host states for breaches of the treaties' substantive
provisions-an opportunity not provided by FCN treaties.2 23 Despite
these differences, however, many of the substantive provisions of

217.

The OECD Draft ultimately failed to gain the support of member states
such
as
Greece,
Portugal
and
Turkey,
because
certain
provisions ... were perceived unduly to favour capital-exporting states.
Not for the last time, the US government withheld its whole-hearted
support, doubting that the Draft would be accepted by many
developing states, and apparently preferring to conduct its own
bilateral treaty negotiations.

Anthony C. Sinclair, The Origins of the Umbrella Clause in the InternationalLaw of
Investment Protection,20 ARB. INT'L 411, 432 (2004)
218.
VANDEVELDE, supra note 5, at 56.
219.
Id. at 57.
220. Id.
221.
Pamela B. Gann, The U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty Program, 21 STAN.
J. INT'L L. 373, 373-74 (1985).
222.
At a minimum, most investment treaties give covered investors the
procedural protection of access to arbitration to enforce the substantive protections
accorded to their investments under the treaty. VANDEVELDE, supra note 5, at 58. Yet
some treaties also confer certain substantive protections on investors. See, e.g., North
American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, art. 1102(1), 32 I.L.M.
605, 639 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA] ("Each Party shall accord to investors of another
Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own
investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management,
conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments." (emphasis added)).
223.
VANDEVELDE, supra note 5, at 58.
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BITs are derived from U.S. FCN treaties-including protection and
224
security clauses.
In making the shift to BITs, the United States was following in
the footsteps of several European countries, some of which had been
negotiating BITs with developing countries for some time. 225 It took
several years for the new BIT program to bear fruit, but by the mid1980s the United States had succeeded in negotiating BITs with a
2 26
number of developing countries.
A variety of U.S. sources provide insight into the meaning of the
protection and security clauses in those treaties. While the United
States is, of course, only one of the two parties to any given BIT, the
U.S. perspective is of key importance in light of how these treaties are
negotiated. In particular, most BITs are concluded with a developing
country and the U.S. negotiating model is presented as a completed
whole, with little or no bargaining taking place. As former BIT
negotiator Jos6 Alvarez has explained,
The U.S. "cookie-cutter" approach to BIT negotiation results in a
one-way conversation of imposed terms. A BIT negotiation is not a
discussion between sovereign equals. It is more like an intensive
training seminar conducted by the United States, on U.S. terms, on
227
what it would take to comply with the U.S. draft.

Accordingly, if one seeks to understand the relevant provisions from
the perspective of their drafters, that inquiry must focus on U.S.
sources. The subparts that follow collect evidence of that nature.
1.

The Scope of the Standard

On the question of whether the notion of protection and security
extends beyond police protection, one piece of evidence is an article
written by Pamela Gann in 1985, shortly after she completed work in
the U.S. BIT program at the Investment Division of the Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative. 228 Gann explained in that article that the
protection and security standard "commits the host party to provide
[covered] investments the full protection and security of its legal,
judicial, and protective agencies," which must be "not be less than
that required by international law. ' 22 9 By referring to "legal and
judicial agencies," Gann was acknowledging that the duty goes
beyond police protection, just as the notion had been understood in

224.
225.

Id.
See id. at 55.
See KENNETH

226.
J.
VANDEVELDE,
U.S. INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT
AGREEMENTS 91-94 (2009).
227.
Jos6 E. Alvarez, Remarks, 86 AM. SOCY INT'L L. PROC. 532, 553 (1992).

228.
229.

Gann, supra note 221, at 390.
Id. (emphasis added).
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the FCN treaty era. She was acknowledging, in particular, that the
standard requires that each party have a legal system in place
(consisting of its legislative, judicial, and executive organs) that is
capable of protecting and securing covered investments.
Moreover, the United States itself explicitly acknowledged,
shortly after Gann wrote this article, that the protection and security
standard contemplates a degree of legal security. This can be seen in
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ELSI case, which the United
2 30
States filed in 1987 on behalf of a U.S. company, Raytheon.
Raytheon's Italian subsidiary, ELSI, had ceased operations after a
group of workers occupied its factory in response to a round of layoffs,
and the local mayor issued a "requisition order" that placed the
company into involuntary bankruptcy. 23 1 The United States
contended that Italian authorities breached the protection and
security clause of the U.S.-Italy FCN Treaty23 2 in two respects. First,
they allegedly failed to prevent or remedy the occupation of ELSI's
plant by the workers. 23 3 Second, a local administrative official
allegedly took too long (sixteen months) in ruling on ELSI's appeal
against the requisition order.23 4 Although the first contention was
based on an alleged lack of physical security, the second was
predicated on an alleged absence of legal security, i.e., a failure to
decide a legal petition with sufficient dispatch. Indeed, counsel for the
United States characterized Italy's alleged failure in this regard as a
denial of "procedural justice," 23 5 resulting from the lack of an
adequate remedial mechanism.236
The ICJ ultimately ruled in favor of Italy in this case. With
regard to the United States' first contention, the ICJ concluded that
the Italian authorities had provided an adequate degree of protection
under the circumstances. 237 With regard to the second, the court
concluded that the United States had not established that, but for the
delay in the ruling on the appeal, ELSI would not have gone

230.
See Elettronica Sicula S.P.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. It.),
1, 1989 I.C.J. 15, (July
20) (describing the nature of the protection and security standard).
231.
Id.
1, 16.
232.
U.S.-Italy FCN Treaty, supra note 181, art. V, T 1 ("The nationals of each
High Contracting Party shall receive, within the territories of the other High
Contracting Party, the most constant protection and security for their persons and
property, and shall enjoy in this respect the full protection and security required by
international law.").
233.
See Elettronica Sicula S.P.A., supra note 230, 105 (noting the assertion
that Italian authorities breached the protection and security clause of the U.S.-Italy
FCN Treaty by allowing ELSI workers to occupy the plant).
234.
Id.
109.
235.
Id.
110.
236. Id.
237.
Id.
108.
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bankrupt. 238 The ICJ added that a delay of sixteen months was not,
in any event, so extraordinary as to be contrary to the international
minimum standard of treatment. 239 This provides yet another
example of the treaty standard of protection and security being
equated with the international minimum standard. Furthermore, the
ICJ did not question the premise behind the United States' second
contention that the protection and security clause would have been
violated if Italy's legal system was sufficiently defective in its handling
of a foreigner's claim. Indeed, some have argued that the ICJ
implicitly accepted this premise.2 40 At a minimum, though, this case
demonstrates that the United States was of the view at the time-well
into the BIT era-that the treaty standard of protection and security
contemplates a form of legal security.
It was not until 2004 that the United States suddenly reversed
course by amending its model BIT to define the standard as limited to
a duty of police protection. 241 While this reversal may seem curious, it
is readily explainable as a reaction to certain arbitral decisions
rendered in the early 2000s, in which tribunals interpreted protection
and security (and fair and equitable treatment) as contemplating a
very broad form of legal security. As discussed in greater detail in
Part IV.A below, certain tribunals read these standards as requiring
that host states refrain from passing new laws, or modifying their
interpretations of existing laws, in a way adverse to covered foreign
investments. U.S. treaty negotiators searched for a way to foreclose
such broad interpretations going forward, and the solution they came
2 42
up with was to limit the standard to police protection.
Whether or not this new approach to drafting is appropriate is
discussed below in Part JV.B. In any event, however, this approach
has no impact on the protection and security provisions in the
multitude of U.S. investment treaties concluded before it was
adopted. Such treaties should therefore still be seen as contemplating
a degree of legal security-even if not the extreme version of legal
security suggested by the above-referenced tribunals.

110.
111-12.

238.
239.

Id.
Id.

240.

See, e.g., NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 5, at 311-12.

Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
241.
2, 2004 [hereinafter 2004 U.S. Model BIT], available at
Investment, art. 5,
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/l17601.pdf.
242.
See Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a
Boon to the Legitimacy of International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT'L L. 471, 495
(2009) (describing the amended definitions in the 2004 U.S. Model BIT as a reaction to
decisions concerning the relevant standards); see also Trevor Zeyl, Chartingthe Wrong
Course: The Doctrine of Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty Law, 49 ALTA. L.
REV. 203, 229 (2011) (arguing that these definitions were added "in an effort to reign
[sic] in some of the more expansive interpretations tribunals have come up with").
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Relationship to Other Standards

Apart from contemplating a degree of legal security, another
notable feature of the protection and security clauses in U.S. BITs
concluded prior to 2004 is that they are always preceded by a fair and
equitable treatment clause and followed by an admonition that the
treatment and protection to be accorded must be no less than that
24 3
required by international law.
A debate has arisen over whether these notions of fair and
equitable treatment and protection and security are intended to
express principles of customary international law, or are intended as
24 4
autonomous standards that go above and beyond international law.
One can refer to the former view as the "equating" approach, because
it equates fair and equitable treatment and protection and security
with the international minimum standard, and to the latter as the
"additive" approach, because it sees the treaty standards as additive
to customary international law.
The equating approach has in its favor the fact that the U.S.
drafters of these provisions clearly viewed the standards as
expressing the international minimum standard. For example, in her
1985 article, former BIT negotiator Gann asserted that the fair and
equitable treatment standard "provides, in effect, a 'minimum
'245
standard' which forms part of customary international law.
Similarly, former BIT negotiator Kenneth Vandevelde has described
the full protection and security standard as "an established standard
of customary international law," and has asserted that when BITs
incorporate this standard, they "make explicit that the standard

243.

For example, the U.S.-Bangladesh BIT states:

Investment of nationals and companies of either Party shall at all times be
accorded fair and equitable treatment and shall enjoy full protection and
security in the territory of the other Party. The treatment, protection and
security of investment shall be in accordance with applicable national laws, and
shall in no case be less than that required by international law.
Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, U.S.Bangl., art. II, 3, Mar. 12, 1986, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-23 (1986).
244.
Authorities interpreting fair and equitable treatment, protection and
security, or both as principles of customary international law include, for example,
Genin v. Republic of Est., ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, Award, T 367 (June 25, 2001) 17
ICSID REv.-FOR. INVEST. L.J. 395 (2002); Thomas, supra note 200, at 51-100. See
also Gus VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 87 (2007)
(describing the standards as expressions of the minimum standard of treatment).
Authorities treating fair and equitable treatment, protection and security, or both as
autonomous standards include, for example, Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/12, Annulment Proceeding, 361 (July 14, 2006); Lemire v. Ukraine,
ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, 77 244-54, 284
(Jan. 14, 2010); Schreuer, supranote 78, at 364.
245.
Gann, supra note 221, at 389.
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applies to covered investment, although it would apply through
customary law even if it were not included in the treaty."246 In
addition, the letters of submittal associated with pre-2004 U.S. BITs
consistently describe both fair and equitable treatment and protection
and security as expressing principles of customary international law,
247
and the international minimum standard in particular.
It is also notable that the investment chapter of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)248 explicitly ties both
standards to international law. Article 1105 of NAFTA is entitled
"Minimum Standard of Treatment" and provides: "Each Party shall
accord to investments of investors of another Party treatment in
accordance with international law, including fair and equitable
treatment and full protection and security. ' 249 It has been pointed out
that this formulation-and the use of the term including in
particular-seems to treat fair and equitable treatment and
protection and security as elements of international law. 250 Moreover,
in 2001 the NAFTA parties (acting via the NAFTA Free Trade
Commission) issued a joint interpretive statement confirming their
mutual intention that "the concepts of 'fair and equitable treatment'
and 'full protection and security' do not require treatment in addition
to or beyond that which is required by the customary international
'251
law minimum standard of treatment of aliens.
Unlike NAFTA, however, U.S. BITs concluded prior to 2004 do
not refer to these standards as being included within international
law, and they do not explicitly equate them with the international
minimum standard. Rather, they express the standards and then
assert that the treatment and protection to be accorded must be no
less than that required by international law. Some proponents of the

246.
VANDEVELDE, supra note 5, at 243. Similar views have been expressed
officially by other countries. See Thomas, supra note 200, at 48 (noting that the OECD
canvassed its members in the early 1980s regarding their understanding of the term
"fair and equitable treatment," and reported a consensus that "fair and equitable
treatment introduced a substantive legal standard referring to general principles of
international law even if this is not explicitly stated").
247.
See Thomas, supra note 200, at 49-50 & n.78 (identifying a multitude of
letters of submittal from the late 1980s and 1990s that describe the provisions
referring to fair and equitable treatment and protection and security as incorporating
principles of customary international law, and in particular the international minimum
standard of treatment).
248.
NAFTA, supra note 222.
249.
Id. 1 (emphasis added).
250.
See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 200, at 55-56 (explaining that this language
shows that the NAFTA parties tied fair and equitable treatment and full protection
and security to international law).
251.
NAFTA Free Trade Comm'n, Notes of Interpretationof Certain Chapter 11
Provisions, pt. 2 (July 31, 2001), available at http://www.international.gc.ca/tradeagreements-accords-commerciaux/disp-diff/NAFTA-Interpr.aspx.
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additive approach focus on this and assert that while U.S. BITs treat
international law as a floor on the level of protection to be provided, it
does not operate as a ceiling in the sense of limiting the fair and
52
equitable treatment and protection and security standards.
The truth may lie somewhere between these two positions. In
light of the origins of the standards and their characterization by U.S.
officials, it appears likely that they were intended to impose
obligations equivalent to the international minimum standard, as
that standard is understood by capital-exporting countries.
Nevertheless, U.S. treaty drafters have long been mindful that
capital-importing states do not always share their view of
international law. 253 For that reason, U.S. treaty drafters have
sometimes hesitated to explicitly equate fair and equitable treatment
and protection and security with the international minimum
standard, out of concern that the other party might dispute the
25 4
latter's content.
The formulation adopted in pre-2004 U.S. BITs was likely an
attempt to deal with this dilemma. Specifically, the drafters took two
standards (fair and equitable treatment and protection and security,
respectively) that are derived from customary international law and
have established meanings in international jurisprudence, treaty
practice, diplomatic discourse, and scholarly literature, and they
expressed those standards in a free-standing way-not in order to
impose on the parties duties beyond their meanings in those sources,
but to ensure that those duties would apply even if the other party (or
an arbitral tribunal) did not agree that they are separately and
independently imposed by customary international law. Under this

252.
For an example of such reasoning, see Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No.
ARB/06/18, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability,
253, 284 (Jan. 14, 2010).
253.
See, e.g., Stanley D. Metzger, Multilateral Conventions for the Protection of
PrivateForeign Investment, 9 J. PUB. L. 133, 143 (1960).
Multilateral negotiations have been found to produce unsatisfactory results,
and the reasons are not difficult to perceive. There are great variances among
nations as to the degree to which they are prepared to bind themselves legally
to accord fair treatment, even among those which in fact accord fair treatment
in practice.... Efforts at general uniform arrangements tend to break down
over the differences among individual countries and their varying legal systems
and economies.
Id. (quoting a Congressional transcript from 1957 featuring the testimony of a U.S.
State Department official).
254.
See VANDEVELDE, supra note 226, at 234 (explaining that U.S. treaty
negotiators refrained from equating the protection and security standard with
international law in FCN treaty provisions relating to protection of foreign property
out of concern "that the principle that international law protected foreign property was
sufficiently controversial that including a reference to it might actually weaken the
treaty").
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reading, it is correct to view the fair and equitable treatment and
protection and security standards as autonomous in the limited sense
that they are not dependent upon the existence of an international
minimum standard having any particular content. Yet it would be a
mistake to view those standards as having meanings materially
different from those suggested by their usage in jurisprudence, treaty
practice, diplomatic discourse, and scholarly literature on the
assumption that they form part of customary internationallaw.
Some have contended that the debate over the nature of these
standards is effectively moot, because even if they are equivalent to
the international minimum standard, the latter has evolved in recent
years to the point that it is now comparable to the expansive
interpretations of protection and security and fair and equitable
treatment offered by arbitrators who view them as autonomous. 255 To
be sure, customary norms can evolve over time, and a particular
obligation may be more expansive today than it was in the past. One
should nevertheless be cautious about finding any dramatic
transformation in the content of customary norms, because custom
tends to evolve quite gradually. 256 While custom can evolve rapidly in
some contexts, this requires something extraordinary. According to
Michael Scharf, acceleration of the custom-formation process requires
"widespread and unequivocal response [by states] to a paradigmchanging event. '257 An example of a paradigm-shifting event is the
commission of unprecedented atrocities during World War II, which
led to the establishment of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the
recognition of individual international criminal liability. 25 8 Others
argue that customary international law can evolve without a shift in
state practice, provided the states concerned offer an explicit
acknowledgement of the existence of the new obligations, such as via

255.

See, e.g., Roland Kidger, 'Fairand Equitable Treatment' and Sustainable

Development, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT LAW 241, 245-46

(Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger et al. eds., 2011) (asserting that the international
minimum standard has broadened as a result of recent expansive interpretations of
fair and equitable treatment provisions in investment treaties).
256.
See Michael P. Scharf, Seizing the "Grotian Moment" Accelerated
Formation of Customary International Law in Times of Fundamental Change, 43
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 439, 445-46 (2010) ("Normally, customary international
law... arises out of the slow accretion of widespread state practice evincing a sense of
legal obligation (opinio juris).... [Tihe U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the
process of establishing customary international law can take decades or even
centuries.").
257.
Id. at 446.
258.
Id. at 454 (explaining that before World War II it was generally accepted
that a state's treatment of its own citizens within its own borders was its own business,
but that afterward it came to be recognized that international law protects individual
citizens against abuses by their governments and imposes individual criminal liability
on officials under some circumstances).
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UN General Assembly declarations. 259 Under either view, however,
the conditions for accelerated custom formation have not been met in
relation to the international minimum standard. There have been no
explicit recognitions by states of heightened obligations associated
with the minimum standard of treatment, let alone any paradigmchanging event and associated widespread and unequivocal shift in
state practice with regard to the protection and treatment of
260
foreigners.
In light of the foregoing, there is no reason to believe that the
international minimum standard (including the customary norm of
protection and security) has undergone any radical transformation of
late. Accordingly, the way the customary notion of protection and
security has been interpreted and applied in the past remains quite
relevant to understanding its meaning today.

IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW

Now that an interpretation of protection and security consistent
with the VCLT framework has been identified, it is worth considering
its implications for international investment law. To that end, the
subparts that follow employ that interpretation as the lens through
which to view and critique modern jurisprudence relating to the
standard, as well as the recent approach to drafting protection and
security clauses in U.S. investment treaties.
A. A Critiqueof Modern Protectionand Security Jurisprudence
As noted in the Introduction and in Part II.A, several tribunals
in recent years have asserted that the duty of protection and security
is limited to physical protection. Parts II and III demonstrated that
this conclusion is untenable, at least with regard to U.S. BITs
concluded prior to 2004. As explained below, however, even tribunals

259.
This notion is commonly referred to as "instant custom," and was first
articulated by Bin Cheng. Bin Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space:
"Instant"International Customary Law?, 5 INDIAN INT'L L.J. 23 (1965), reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL LAW: TEACHING AND PRACTICE 237, 249 (Bin Cheng ed., 1982). This
notion of instant custom has been widely criticized, however. For examples of works
criticizing this concept, see G.J.H. VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw, 86 (1983) ("[C]ustomary law and instantaneousness are
irreconcilable concepts."); Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of International Law, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW 115, 124 (Malcolm Evans ed., 2006).
600-03, (NAFTA Ch. 11
260.
See Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, Award,
Arb. Trib. 2009) (holding that the claimant had failed to demonstrate any significant
recent evolution of the minimum standard of treatment as reflected in state practice
and opinio juris).
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that have correctly interpreted protection and security as extending
beyond physical security have sometimes delineated the standard's
contours too expansively.
One case in which the tribunal arguably read protection and
security too broadly is Occidental Exploration, Ltd. v. Republic of
Ecuador (Oxy 1).261 That tribunal held that Ecuador violated the
protection and security provision in the U.S.-Ecuador BIT when the
Ecuadorian tax authority changed its interpretation of a tax law and
began denying value added tax (VAT) reimbursements to the
claimant, a U.S. oil company.2 6 2 The tribunal reached this result by
effectively equating protection and security with fair and equitable
treatment-pronouncing that a violation of fair and equitable
treatment automatically results in a violation of protection and
security-and asserting that fair and equitable treatment requires
that the host state maintain the "stability of the legal and business
framework" of the country. 263 The tribunal asserted further that
when the Ecuadorian tax authority modified its approach to VAT
reimbursements, "the framework under which the investment was
made and operates [was] changed in an important manner," and the
'264
tax authority's new interpretation was "manifestly wrong.
Significantly, however, the tribunal in no way conditioned its holding
with regard to fair and equitable treatment and protection and
security on any finding that the new interpretation was in bad faith,
arbitrary, or discriminatory, 265 and the tribunal does not seem to
have considered it material that the investor was free to challenge
the new interpretation in local courts. 266 The tribunal seems to have
felt it is enough to violate the protection and security standard if the
host state adopts a new legal interpretation that alters the legal

261.
Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Republic of Ecuador (Oxy 1), LCIA
Case No. UN3467, Award, 7 183, 187 (London Ct. Int'l Arb. 2004).
262.
Id.
1-7, 183-87.
263.
Id.
183-87.
264.
Id.
184.
In another portion of the opinion, the tribunal asserted that the Ecuadorian
265.
tax authority discriminated against the claimant in the sense that it gave certain
Ecuadorian exporters VAT reimbursements, but denied them to the claimant. Id.
TT 167-77. Yet in the discussion of the protection and security claim, the tribunal
made no reference to this alleged discrimination and did not suggest that the existence
of discrimination was necessary to its finding that Ecuador violated the protection and
security clause. Id. TT 183-87.
266.
The tribunal in another case arising from the same change in approach to
VAT reimbursements observed that the claimant's Ecuadorian subsidiary could have
challenged the new interpretation in Ecuadorian courts, and that there was no
evidence that the Ecuadorian tax authority had reached its new interpretation in bad
faith. On that basis, the tribunal declined to find a treaty violation. See EnCana Corp.
194-97 (London Ct. of Int'l
v. Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN3481, Award,
Arb. 2006).
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framework in a way that is adverse to the investment and incorrect
according to the independent judgment of the tribunal.
If that is what the tribunal had in mind, its approach was
problematic because it fails to distinguish in any meaningful way
between protection and security and fair and equitable treatment and
does not sufficiently delimit either standard. If the tribunal in Oxy I
had read protection and security in a way consistent with its
customary parameters, it could not have found Ecuador in violation of
that standard based on the decision of a tax authority without first
finding that the Ecuadorian legal system was incapable of securing
the investor's property rights. A mere finding that the tax authority
applied the law incorrectly would not have been sufficient to establish
a denial of protection and security, so long as the investor could
readily have challenged (and potentially reversed) the interpretation
26 7
in local courts.
Another case in which the tribunal arguably read protection and
security too broadly is CME. In that case, the tribunal found that the
Czech Republic violated the protection and security clause in the
Netherlands-Czech Republic BIT by, inter alia, amending its law
governing broadcast licenses (the Media Law) in a way that
disadvantaged a local company (CNTS) in which the claimant had
invested, and endorsing (through the actions of an administrative
agency, the Media Council) an attempt by CNTS's business partner,
Dr. Zelezn, to use that amendment as a basis to terminate the
company's contractual relationship. 268 The tribunal failed to
articulate in any detail the content of the protection and security
standard, other than to assert that it obliges the host state to "ensure
that neither by amendment of its laws nor by actions of its
administrative bodies is the agreed and approved security and
protection of the foreign investor's investment withdrawn or

267.
This is because the protection and security standard focuses on the conduct
of the state as a whole (i.e., the entire governmental system). In other words, if one
state organ could readily correct a mistaken decision by another (upon application by
the investor), then the state as a whole cannot be said to have failed in its obligation to
protect and secure the investment. For a detailed discussion of the relevance of local
remedies to investment treaty claims, see George K. Foster, Striking a Balance
Between Investor Protections & National Sovereignty: The Relevance of Local Remedies
in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 201, 204-09 (2011)
(collecting cases holding that certain investment treaty claims can be defective on the
merits if the relevant injury could be readily corrected via local remedies, and
explaining their rationale).
268.
See Franck, supra note 19, at 1559-63 (describing the factual and
procedural background of the case); see also CME Czech Republic BV v. Czech
613 (UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. 2001) ("The Media Council's
Republic, Partial Award,
actions in 1996 and its actions and inactions in 1999 were targeted to remove the
security and legal protection of the Claimant's investment in the Czech Republic.").
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devalued. '269 Such a vague formulation of the standard is troubling
because it gives no guidance as to when an adverse legal amendment
or administrative action is inconsistent with the security due to an
investment, and therefore could have a chilling effect on good faith
270
legislative or regulatory action.
The tribunal in another case arising from the same facts, Lauder
v. Czech Republic, 271 employed a preferable approach. This case was
brought by a different investor in CNTS (Ronald Lauder), under a
different treaty (the U.S.-Czech Republic BIT). The tribunal in
Lauder likewise viewed the duty of protection and security as
extending to legal security, but articulated its parameters more
precisely. It held that the duty "obliges the Parties to exercise such
due diligence in the protection of foreign investment as reasonable
under the circumstances," and requires that the host state have an
adequate legal system and make the same available to covered
272
investors.
Applying this standard to the facts, the tribunal rejected the
protection and security claim. It found no evidence that the Media
Council applied the law in an arbitrary or discriminatory way, or that
the amendment was calculated to destroy the investment. 2 73 Rather,
it was the conduct of Dr. Zelezn -a private business partner-that
harmed CNTS, and CNTS was free to pursue a contractual claim
against him in Czech courts. 274 According to the tribunal, the Czech
Republic's only obligation in relation to that dispute was to "keep its
judicial system available for the Claimant and any entities he
controls to bring their claims, and for such claims to be properly
examined and decided in accordance with domestic and international
law."

275

269.
CME, Partial Award, at 613.
270.
See SALACUSE, supra note 86, at 233 (arguing that investors should always
expect "reasonable evolutions in host state law," such as "the adjustment of
environmental regulations to internationally accepted standards or the improvement of
labour laws to benefit the host state's workforce," and that such developments should
not give rise to liability under an investment treaty so long as they are made in good
faith and without discrimination).
271.
Lauder v. Czech Republic, Final Award, T 308 (UNCITRAL Arb. Trib.

2001).
272.
273.
274.
275.
security in

Id. 1 308, 314.
Id. TT 310-11.
311-12.
Id.
Id. 1 314. The tribunal applied a similar interpretation of protection and
another decision:

The Respondent's duty under the Treaty was, first, to keep its judicial system
available for the Claimant to bring its contractual claims and, second, that the
claims would be properly examined in accordance with domestic and
international law by an impartial and fair court. There is no evidence-not
even an allegation-that the Respondent has violated this obligation.
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The Lauder tribunal's view of the protection and security
standard appears consistent with traditional conceptions of that
standard, as outlined in Part III, above, and gives the host state
adequate leeway to legislate and apply its laws.
A more recent case in which the tribunal articulated a similar
understanding of protection and security is AES Summit Generation
Ltd. v. Republic of Hungary.276 The claimant in that case-a UK
company that had invested in an electricity generation company in
Hungary-alleged that Hungary violated the protection and security
clause of the Energy Charter Treaty when it amended its laws
governing the rates due to electricity generators, resulting in
financial losses for the claimant. 2 77 In evaluating this claim, the
tribunal described the content of the protection and security standard
as follows:
[T]he duty to provide most constant protection and security to
investments is a state's obligation to take reasonable steps to protect its
investors (or to enable its investors to protect themselves) against
harassment by third parties and/or state actors .... And while it can, in
appropriate circumstances, extend beyond a protection of physical
security, it certainly does not protect against a state's right (as was the
case here) to legislate or regulate in a manner which may negatively
affect a claimant's investment, provided that the state acts reasonably
in the circumstances and with a view to achieving objectively rational
278
public policy goals.

Applying that standard to the facts before it, the tribunal
rejected the protection and security claim. The tribunal emphasized
that Hungary was free to amend its laws in good faith, having never
signed any stabilization agreement or otherwise committed that it
would not modify its laws.2 79 As with the Lauder tribunal's approach,
this gives the host state leeway to modify its legal framework, while
still allowing the state to be held accountable under the protection
and security standard if it does so in a way that is arbitrary or
amounts to harassment.

Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lith., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award,
360 (Sept. 11, 2007).
276.
AES Summit Generation Ltd. v. Republic of Hung., ICSID Case No.
13.3.1-13.1.5 (Sept. 23, 2010).
ARB/07/22, Award,
Id.
4.1, 13.1.1-13.1.5.
277.
Id.
13.3.2.
278.
279.
Id.
13.3.4-13.3.6.
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B. A Critiqueof the Current U.S. DraftingApproach
In light of awards such as those in Oxy I and CME, it is easy to
understand the decision by the United States (and certain other
countries that have followed its lead 28s ) to limit the scope of the
protection and security and fair and equitable treatment standards in
newly concluded treaties.
Indeed, a key reason why so many countries were willing to sign
BITs during the 1980s and 1990s was their impression that the
treaties, for the most part, simply incorporated and restated
obligations already existing under customary international law. As
Alvarez has explained in discussions with prospective BIT partners
during that period, "U.S. negotiators argued that the BIT offered only
minimal stabilization and imposed only a few, non-onerous, and
uncontroversial constraints on government action." 28 1 Moreover, the
United States itself held the view that "much of what the U.S. BIT
contained was already reflected in the traditional principles of
international law regarding the treatment of aliens, drawn from the
doctrine of state responsibility." 28 2 Similarly, British negotiators have
acknowledged that UK BITs were specifically crafted to closely track
customary international law (with a few exceptions, such as the
inclusion of most-favored-nation provisions) because the treaties
would have been unsalable to potential treaty partners had they done
otherwise.2 8 3 Consequently, by reading fair and equitable treatment
and protection and security as divorced from international law,
arbitrators risk imposing on the treaty parties obligations they never
contemplated-and which do not accord with their interests and

280.
See Lindsey Marchessault, Recent Trends in International Investment
Agreements in Asia, 1 TRANSNAT'L DisP. MGMT. 23-24 (2011), www.transnationaldispute-management.com/article.asp?key=1673 (noting that a number of countries
apart from the United States have recently concluded investment treaties that equate
fair and equitable treatment with the international minimum standard).
281.
Jos6 E. Alvarez, The Evolving BIT, in INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 5 (Ian A. Laird & Todd Weiler eds., 2010).
282.
Id. at 6; see also Thomas, supra note 200, at 54 (arguing that states never
would have signed investment treaties containing fair and equitable treatment clauses
if they believed their actions would be evaluated by arbitrators according to subjective
notions of "fairness" and "equity," divorced from established legal principles).
283.
See Eileen Denza & Shelagh Brooks, Investment Protection Treaties: United
Kingdom Experience, 36 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 908, 911-12 (1987) (explaining that
politically sensitive provisions were drafted so as to not to go beyond what was thought
to reflect international law); see also DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 2, at 186 (noting
that "[m]ost-favoured-nation treatment is not required under customary international
law").

2012]

RECOVERING "PROTECTIONAND SECURITY"

1155

values-thereby undermining the legitimacy of investment treaty
28 4
arbitration.
From the perspective of legitimacy, therefore, revising
investment treaties to equate the fair and equitable treatment and
protection and security standards with the international minimum
standard is a step in the right direction. Nevertheless, the way the
U.S. Model BIT has defined protection and security since 2004285 is
problematic because it simultaneously suggests that the notion is a
principle of customary international law and articulates a meaning of
that notion that is inconsistent with its customary meaning. Namely,
it asserts that the standard is limited to police protection when
protection and security has never been so limited. This risks
increasing the confusion over the meaning of the standard in
customary international law, thereby further undermining the
28 6
legitimacy of this area of law.
Going forward, it would be better to delete the language defining
protection and security as limited to police protection and simply
record that protection and security and fair and equitable treatment
collectively express the international minimum standard. If a more
detailed definition of protection and security is deemed necessary, it
should be consistent with the standard's customary meaning, as
described in Part III.E, above. Alternatively, the definition could
assert that the treaty parties intend that any aspects of the
customary norm of protection and security beyond police protection
shall be covered by other provisions of the treaty, including, for
example, the fair and equitable treatment and expropriation clauses.
In any event, however, the treaty should avoid perpetuating the
misunderstanding that the customary norm of protection and security
is somehow limited to police protection, which it is not and never has
been.

284.
See Sornarajah, supra note 18, at 40-41 (arguing that "the expansionary
attitudes taken by arbitrators who have accepted the expansionary litigation theories
of lawyers who are seemingly taking the law in investment treaties beyond what the
parties had originally intended" is resulting in a "crisis of legitimacy"); see also
Grossman, supra note 20, at 144 (arguing that international adjudication will not be
perceived as legitimate by international actors if it is not "consistent with commonly
accepted principles or discourse of legal decision making" and in accordance "with
international actors' interests and values").
285.
See 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 24, art. 5, 2; 2004 U.S. Model BIT,
supranote 241, art. 5, 2.
286.
See Grossman, supra note 20, at 149-50 (explaining that inconsistency and
lack of clarity can undermine a law's legitimacy); see also THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE
POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONs 24, 152 (1990) (discussing the importance of

coherence to the legitimacy of a rule of international law or an application of such a
rule).
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V. CONCLUSION

This Article has explained how a thorough application of the
VCLT interpretive framework can resolve the controversies
surrounding the ubiquitous but enigmatic protection and security
standard found in most investment treaties.
With regard to the debate over whether the standard is limited
to physical security, the evidence demonstrates that it is not so
limited, at least as used in most U.S. treaties. Rather, it should be
seen as a general, overarching standard that obliges the host state to
have a system capable of protecting and securing the investment
(both legally and physically), which is often further elaborated via
other, more specific treaty provisions likewise aimed at enhancing the
protection of investment. These may include, inter alia, provisions
requiring effective means of asserting claims and enforcing rights and
compensation for expropriation. The standard should not, however, be
seen as precluding good faith, nondiscriminatory changes in the law.
With regard to the controversy over the relationship between
protection and security and fair and equitable treatment, the
evidence shows that the two standards are both derived from the
same customary norm and are so closely connected that certain
The evidence also shows,
conduct may violate both standards.
however, that these standards are conceptually distinct in that
protection and security focuses on the need for an adequate system of
protection, whereas fair and equitable treatment focuses on the
treatment to be accorded to investors or investments.
If the above interpretations of these standards were to be
consistently embraced by tribunals going forward, and were to find
expression in the definition sections of newly concluded treaties, this
could significantly enhance the legitimacy of international
investment law and investment treaty arbitration. Not only would
this provide much-needed coherence to the jurisprudence, it would
also ensure that host states would not be subjected to unforeseen and
onerous obligations (at least in this context), thereby providing
greater predictability to host states and investors alike. After all,
investors are not the only ones who deserve treatment in accordance
with their legitimate expectations and a reasonably stable and
predictable legal framework; host states do as well.

